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STATUTORY OBSOLESCENCE AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS: THE REVISIONIST
ROLE OF THE COURTS IN FEDERAL
BANKING REGULATION
Donald C. Langevoort*

What do - or should - courts do when asked to interpret an
apparently "obsolete" statute? This question is an important one half
a century or more after the enactment of much of the fundamental
federal legislation in such fields of economic regulation as labor, communications, antitrust, securities, and - the subject of this study banking. For a variety of reasons, including political inertia and special interest pressure, many of these statutes remain substantially unchanged even though the assumptions about marketplace structure
and conditions that formed the basis for the legislation have long since
ceased to hold true.
The dominant jurisprudential tradition states that the courts are
the "faithful agents" of the enacting legislature, and that their role is
therefore limited to determining and carrying out the legislative intent
of that body. If so, statutory obsolescence is irrelevant, a matter of
concern for the legislature but not the courts. 1 At the same time, there
has been vigorous dissent from this tradition. It finds its most notable
expression in Guido Calabresi's A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, 2 which urges judges to assume the power both to update and (in

* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1973, University of Virginia;
J.D. 1976, Harvard Law School. - Ed.
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of Professors John
Coffee, Jonathan Macey, and Joel Seligman.
1. An important contemporary proponent of this view is Judge Richard Posner. See Posner,
Economics, Politics and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1982) [hereinafter Posner, Reading ofStatutes]; Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800 (1983) [hereinafter Posner, Statutory Interpretation]. Posner's writing grows out of an earlier work, Landes & Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975). Judge Frank Easterbrook is also a proponent of fidelity, with the caution that when actual intent is difficult to
discern, there should be a presumption of statutory inapplicability. See Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); see also Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, The Court and the Eco11omic System]. For an example of judicial expression of fidelity, see American Bankers Assn. v.
Connell, 686 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1979), where the court took the unusual step of delaying the
effect of its ruling to allow Congress to act.
2. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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rare cases) invalidate statutes that have lost consistency with the prevailing "legal landscape."
Banking regulation provides an ideal subject for a study of the reaction of the courts to statutory obsolescence. Until fairly recently,
the commercial banking marketplace in a particular location could
properly be considered a discrete one, with the basic "banking" services provided only by a limited number of locally chartered competing
participants. 3 This understanding, for example, formed the basis of
the Supreme Court's restrictive determination in 1963 that in applying
the antitrust laws to bank mergers (1) the relevant product market to
test for undue reduction in competition is the unique "cluster of services" offered by commercial banks, and (2) given legally imposed restraints on entry and expansion, the relevant geographic market is
typically confined to the city or county in which the banks are located.4 If the assumption of limited entry is correct, bank regulation
can succeed by making rules of conduct applicable to all banks in the
relevant market. Since it is presumably impractical for bank customers to avoid the costs of regulation by seeking alternatives or substitutes, no outflow of funds from the market will occur, and no
individual bank will be at a competitive disadvantage. 5
Largely as a result of changes in available technology, the banking
marketplace has changed radically. 6 So-called "delivery innovations"
3. For an economic overview of market analysis and the question of local monopolies, see
Heggestad & Mingo, The Competitive Condition of U.S. Banking Markets and the Impact of
Structural Reform, 32 J. FIN. 649 (1977). The basic services to which the limited market concept
was most clearly applicable were deposit accounts (both demand and savings) and commercial
loans for medium and small businesses. Other banking services, e.g., consumer loans, have long
been offered by nonbank competitors. Commercial loans to the largest corporations, similarly,
are not localized - there has long been a nationwide market for this line of business. As to
deposit accounts, savings banks and savings and loan institutions have provided time deposit
alternatives; these institutions, being subject to restricted entry and regulated much the same as
commercial banks, can be considered banks with respect to that sort of service.
4. United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1963). For a discussion of
the evolution of antitrust theory as it relates to banking in light of some of the marketplace
product changes, see Note, The Line of Commerce for Commercial Bank Mergers: A ProductOriented Redefinition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 907 (1983); May, Redefining the Product Market:
Commercial Bank Mergers in the New Competitive Era, 103 BANKING L.J. 124 (1986).
5. In practice, the uniquely American dual system of banking - which permits banks to
choose a state or federal charter, and as a result establishes competition among regulators - has
often frustrated attempts at effective regulation. See Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model
of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. l (1977). State-chartered banks are subject to
federal regulation if they are members of the Federal Reserve System, controlled by a bank
holding company, or insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. That regulation,
however, is secondary in nature, with substantial deference given the state chartering authority
on questions such as bank po:wers. On the need for reform of this structure, see A. CARRON,
REFORMING THE BANK REGULATORY STRUCTURE (1984).
6. An extremely useful and comprehensive review is found in OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, EFFECTS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
SYSTEMS (1984) [hereinafter EFFECTS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY]; see also Phillips,
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have permitted banks to offer deposit, loans, and other financial services to customers in remote locations. As a result, there has been a de
facto destruction of geographic barriers to entry and growth. In addition, technology has allowed nonbanking institutions to offer products
and services that far more closely resemble (without legally being)
traditional banking ones. These developments in combination have
given consumers means of avoiding regulatory costs by seeking providers of :financial services that are subject to less intrusive regulation,
or none at all, thereby frustrating many traditional regulatory strategies. At the same time, they have reallocated profits and resources
within the industry. In this sense, the business of banking, and the
regulation of banking, can rightly be termed transitional.
Where banking law has delegated discretionary authority to the
various regulatory agencies, marketplace change has been accommodated through a dialectic between bankers' efforts to avoid profit-diminishing restrjctions and regulatory responses to these efforts. The
responses have rarely sought to foreclose the bankers' efforts entirely,
and usually they have taken long enough to formulate that the industry has already moved on to a new set of products and techniques. 7
But much of banking law is not discretionary; rather, it takes the form
of fixed statutory rules. Here, the transitional nature of banking poses
the dilemma for courts that are called upon to interpret such legislation. Many of the statutes governing banking were written long ago,
well before many of the fundamental marketplace changes became
manifest, and they naturally reflect the marketplace assumptions of
their starting points in history. Yet they remain unrevised - not necessarily because those with influence in Congress still hold to the same
assumptions, but because it is politically difficult to upset the status
Changing Technology and Future Financial Activity, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY
125 (R. Aspinwall & R. Eisenbeis eds. 1985). For a discussion of similar changes as they affect
the securities industry, see Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1985).
7. For a discussion of the- industry-regulator dialectic, see Kane, Strategic Planning in a
World ofRegulatory and Technological Change, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY, supra
note 6, at 725, 733-35; Eisenbeis, Inflation and Regulation: The Effects on Financial Institutions
and Structure, in HANDBOOK FOR BANKING STRATEGY, supra note 6, at 65, 66-68; Kane, Accelerating Inflation, Technology, Innovation and the Decreasing Effectiveness ofBanking Regulation,
36 J. FIN. 355 (1981). The reasons why regulators have rarely reacted to foreclose marketplace
innovations are numerous. One is, no doubt, a natural tendency to protect the industry, due both
to the notion of "capture," see text accompanying note 130 infra, and to a legitimate concern for
the industry's financial health. Also important is the politically significant fact that there is a
strong consumer demand for better and less expensive financial services, a factor that can be
compelling if a new service or product is publicly available as the regulators consider whether or
not to take it off the market. Finally, there is the factor ofregulatory competition, which permits
banks to seek the least restrictive regulator and thus makes it unfeasible for any one regulator to
regulate too strictly. See note 5 supra.
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quo. A reviewing court, if sensitive, will recognize that invoking many
of the traditional norms of statutory construction under these circumstances may do nothing more than breathe life into the dying hand of
the past.
This article studies the behavior of the courts faced with this dilemma. After offering in Part I a more detailed analysis of the impact
of marketplace change on banking regulation, it will trace the evolution in statutory interpretation of two sets of statutory provisions. The
most extensive consideration (Part II) will be of a fundamental "product" restriction, the Glass-Steagall Act, a 1933 law purporting to force
banks out of the securities business. Then, Part III will tum to one of
the basic geographic restrictions on entry and expansion, the McFadden Act of 1927, which limits branching by national and member
banks. These two studies should be useful in and of themselves, as
intellectual histories and syntheses of important federal statutes. Indeed, they contain significant observations about the evolution and
current state of the law that have not to this point received scholarly
attention.
Of more general interest, however, is the observation that, in a remarkably similar way under each of the two statutes, judicial behavior
changed dramatically with the onset of transition. This observation
offers support for the view that judicial intervention to control the
problem of obsolescence is more common than the rhetoric of fidelity
would lead one to believe. While courts are likely to engage in truly
purposive statutory construction during the early stages of a statute's
"life cycle," 8 that impulse ceases as the statute ages. At some point
there will be a noticeable but unexplained shift toward canons of construction such as literalism, strict interpretation, and extreme deference to administrative expertise. While the rhetoric of fidelity to
statutory intent remains, application of these maxims in fact produces
outcomes that are removed from any accurate understanding of original legislative will. This shift takes place at roughly the time when the
obsolescence of the statute starts to become apparent. A strong implication - and the hypothesis of this article - is that these canons are
chosen at this point because they effectively limit the applicability of
statutes that may be approaching a stage of harmful senility.
This hypothesis, in tum, raises intriguing questions about the judicial process. Is there enough consistency in the judicial behavior to
call it a predictable response to statutory aging? Is such behavior un8. The concept of a statutory life cycle is recognized in G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 97 (1977).
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restrained judicial activism or is it governed by justifiable neutral principles of law? The conclusion (Part IV) will comment on the
normative implications of these case studies.

I.

BANKING IN TRANSITION

Before turning to the two specific statutory contexts, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the transition in the business of banking that is the setting for the current legal controversies.
Section A of this Part defines the traditional business of banking, and
considers how changes in information technology have affected that
business. Then, section B identifies the principal objectives of banking
regulation and considers their efficacy in light of the marketplace
changes so identified.
A.

The Business of Banking

As traditionally understood, banking is simply one form of financial intermediation. 9 The bank's historically most important supplier
of capital, the depositor, 10 has looked to the bank to provide a combination of three basic services: investment (i.e., offering some sort of
increase in wealth in ·return for use of the capital), safekeeping, and
transaction execution (i.e., facilitating transfers of the depositors'
funds to third parties). While the relative importance of these functions varies from depositor to depositor, the attractiveness of a bank
deposit is that it provides a convenient mix of safety, liquidity, and
return on savings.
At the other end of the banking business stands the principal user
of the capital, the borrower. 11 Historically, the bank's prime investment function was to provide relatively short-term credit to those
businesses facing a time lag between incurring expenses and receiving
expected income. 12 Such extensions of commercial credit facilitate
both current operations and expansion.
That an intermediary has been needed to satisfy the conflicting
9. See, e.g., Clark, The Soundness ofFinancial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976); see also
R. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 2 (1978).
10. The depositor is the principal supplier of capital, but hardly the exclusive one. Shareholder-contributed capital and retained earnings, along with funds borrowed on a nondeposit
basis, constitute other important sources. See Schweitzer, Bank Liability Management: For Better or Worse?, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV., Dec. 1974, at 3.
11. Other end uses of bank funds include investments in certain types of securities, loans to
other banks, etc. See Anderson & Burger, Asset Management and Commercial Bank Portfolio
Behavior: Theories and Practice, 24 J. FIN. 207 (1969).
12. See R. WEST, BANKING REFORM AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1863-1923, 18-20
(1977).
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needs of depositors and borrowers is obvious. A bank pools its deposits in a way that permits any given depositor substantial liquidity, yet
- because the liquidity need of the depositors as a group tends to be
relatively stable and predictable - allows the bank to invest in a portfolio of longer-term loans. Apart from this pooling function, the bank
also serves as a specialist in seeking out and analyzing lending possibilities and monitoring those investments - internalizing the information and transaction costs the depositor would otherwise incur. A
bank's principal source of revenue has been the aggregate spread between income received from its portfolio and the cost of its deposit
base. In addition, of course, there are the fees generated from transaction services, safekeeping, and the like. 13
Information technology has an immense impact on the historic
banking process, because so much of what banks and other :financial
intermediaries do is simply to manage information and transaction
costs. 14 On the deposit side, there is no compelling reason why a person would choose a bank deposit, as opposed to some other form of
investment, for that portion of savings for which near total liquidity is
unnecessary. The historic preference for such deposits rests largely on
some combination of tradition and habit, the convenience and safety
such accounts afford, and the relative inaccessibility of available alternatives. An important impact of technology has been to increase substantially the range of attractive nonbank options available to the
depositor. The most dramatic example is the money market fund. 15 A
money market fund is an investment company that offers to the public
shares of stock on a continuing basis, and stands ready to redeem such
securities on shareholder demand. No return on the investment is
guaranteed, but the fund limits investment of its pooled assets to relatively secure, short-term obligations of the government and large financial institutions. Apart from the management and distribution fees
paid to the fund's advisers and underwriters, returns on investment are
passed through directly to shareholders. Communications technology
13. While substantial regulation prevailed, banks subsidized many of these services with
profits made from the spread, pricing them at or below cost. With the recent deregulation, such
subsidization has become impracticable, and banks have been forced to price such services more
realistically - incurring substantial consumer (not to mention political) wrath in the process.
See Wall St. J., July 22, 1986, at 12, col. 1.
14. The most obvious impact, but not one of central importance to this analysis, is in the area
of transaction services - the movement away from paper-based commercial transaction toward
electronic funds transfer. See M. MAYER, THE MONEY BAZAARS: UNDERSTANDING THE
BANKING REVOLUTION AROUND Us (1984); Frisbee, The ACH: An Elusive Dream, EcoN.
REV., Mar. 1986, at 4.
15. See Rosenblum, Siegel & Pavel, Banks and Nonbanks: A Run for the Money, EcoN.
PERSP., May-June 1983, at 8-9; Langevoort, supra note 6, at 748 & n.5; NATIONAL AssOCIATION
OF SECURITIES DEALERS, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY OF TOMORROW 22-23 (1982).
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- toll-free telephone numbers, computer record-keeping, and wire
transfers - allows the purchase and redemption process to occur extremely fast; the result, from the shareholder's perspective, is bank-like
liquidity. During the 1970s, money market funds introduced payment
mechanisms (with the assistance of participating banks) to allow redeemed funds to be directed to third parties as well, effectively creating checking accounts for fund shareholders.16
Technology has done more than facilitate the development of competing financial products that could draw funds away from bank deposits. The money market funds also demonstrated - as banks
independently were discovering - that electronic communications fa.
cilities could expand the relevant geographic market from which funds
could be drawn and to which investments could be directed. A tollfree telephone number connecting the customer to a highly efficient
record-keeping office was sufficient for many investors; it was unnecessary that the firm have a physical presence near the customer in order
to attract his or her funds.17
In tandem, these two technology-based developments have had a
dramatic effect on the more affiuent portion of the banking marketplace.18 At one time depositors seeking liquidity and return on rela16. The money market fund then became the base from which was built a more complex
competitive product, the so-called cash management account. Securities broker-dealer firms, beginning with Merrill Lynch, invited customers to establish accounts that permitted prompt and
easy electronic transfer of funds among a wide variety of investments; cash held in the money
market fund could be shifted out when the need for liquidity was less pressing and higher-yielding investments more important, back when cash was necessacy. Merrill Lynch's account also
permitted customers the use of a Visa debit card to "charge" purchases which would be subject
to immediate payment out of the cash account. Also a major part of the account is the ability to
borrow on margin for securities transactions. The Merrill Lynch account is described in 42 Op.
Or. Atty. Gen., 273-77 (1982), a matter where the status of the account was challenged as unlawful banking. That challenge was rejected.
17. See Frieder, Legislating for Interstate Bank Expansion: Financial Deregulation and Public Policy, 9 J. CORP. L. 673, 728 (1984); Smith, A Global View of Technology's Future in Retail
Banking, 7 J. RETAIL BANKING 43, 46 (1985-86). For a description of Citibank's current plans
in this regard, see Mai/ Phone ATM= Bank, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Feb. 4, 1985, at 14.
Advice to consumers along these lines is found in Eisenberg, When It Pays to Use an Out-of-State
Bank, MONEY, Apr. 1985, at 81.
18. This segment of the market is made up of those persons with substantial funds available
for savings and investment. See Prickett, Banking 011 a Segmellted Market, BANl<ERS MAO.,
Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 44. The lower end of the market spectrum is made up of those persons whose
bank deposits are little more than what is needed for current consumption. Technology-based
innovations have largely been directed at the former group, since they are the source of the
largest profitability. It should be noted, however, that as information and transaction costs go
down, the wealth level of the group to which such innovations can be marketed will decline as
well. An example is the cash management account. When introduced, the account required a
minimum of $20,000 in cash or securities. Today, the minimum among the various competing
accounts offered by the securities industcy can be as low as $2500. The lower-end group faces a
marketplace that has not changed substantially in either product or geographic availability.
What is new for this group is far higher fees which reflect the fact that such small accounts do
not offer the bank a profit opportunity that exceeds the cost of handling the account. At one
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tively small amounts of money had, for all practical purposes, a range
of choices limited to those banking and savings institutions located in
the immediate geographic area. With the advent of the new products,
the depositor could choose to avoid banks altogether, or limit use of
the bank to that small amount necessary to cover a local checking
account. And with the development of electronically enhanced means
of entering remote markets, the number of financial institutions banks and nonbanks - competing for a given person's money quickly
increased, again expanding consumer choice. A transitional deposit
marketplace structurally different from that of twenty or thirty years
earlier has resulted.
Comparable developments have taken place on the lending side of
the business of banking. Financial institutions, including trust departments, pension funds, and insurance companies, are willing to loan
money on a short-term basis, accepting rates of interest lower than
those demanded by commercial banks. Through the so-called commercial-paper market, 19 high-quality corporate borrowers have tapped
this demand, utilizing communications and record-keeping technology
that permits efficient matching and transactions between themselves
and their creditors. By issuing commercial paper instead of borrowing
from a bank, corporations effectively eliminate the intermediary in
their acquisition of capital. The growth of the commercial-paper market has had significant impact on banks, eliminating some of the most
profitable borrowers and pressuring banks to make lower-quality loans
to more marginal borrowers to compensate for the loss. The result is
higher risk in the core business of banking.20
Institutional investor demand for short- and medium-term debt,
evidenced by the expansion of the commercial-paper market, has led
as well to a proliferation of the use of "securitized" debt as a financing
device. Securitization is the process whereby a lender creates a pool of
debt instruments (e.g., mortgages, automobile or credit card receivpoint, a New York bank considered requiring smaller customers to use automated teller machines, reserving human tellers for "preferred" customers. This plan met with adverse public
reaction and was not implemented. Some of the policy issues of this trend with respect to lowerincome banking consumers are noted in EFFECTS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, supra note 6,
at 243-44.
19. See M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 626-28 (1983). For an older study, see Note, The
Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 362 (1972). See also
Lowenstein, The Commercial Paper Market and the Federal Securities Laws, 4 CORP. L. REV.
128 (1981).
20. This point is made strongly by Moody's Investors Service, which in a recent report noted
the decline in the credit quality of the banking industry itself as a result of this development. See
48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 152 (Jan. 19, 1987); see also M. MAYER, supra note 14, at 25-26 (1984).
In addition, large borrowers are increasingly able to go overseas to meet their credit and borrowing needs.
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ables), and sells to investors collateralized interests in the pool in the
form of debt securities. 21 The original lender's profits then come
largely from the spread from the underwriting and distribution of the
securities, rather than from compensation for the assumption of risk
throughout the term of the loan. At the same time, the role remains
one of an intermediary - albeit for a much shorter term, and with
emphasis on locating and selling these instruments to net savers willing to bear some or all of the associated risks - in the commercial
financing process. Over time, there is little reason to believe that
securitization will not extend to the full range of loans (including commercial loans) in a bank's portfolio. 22
B. Banking Regulation
The structural change in the banking marketplace has reoriented
thinking about bank regulation. Bank regulation in the United States
is a complicated exercise, long limited in its effectiveness by the fact
that persons wishing to organize a bank could seek either a federal or a
state charter and, for all practical purposes, thereafter switch freely
from one to the other if given reason to do so. History shows repeated
examples of either federal or state regulatory initiatives that failed or
were abandoned upon recognition that the effect would simply be to
cause banks to switch their charters away from the regulatory authority. 23 The technology-based developments noted above have further
complicated and restrained bank regulation, and in some cases have
rendered it self-defeating.

1. Promoting Bank Soundness
A principal objective of bank regulation is the promotion of the
21. See CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER
PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D
SESS., RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES 287-90 (Comm.
Print 1986) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS]. The seller's motivations for
securitization include lower cost of capital, the shifting of risk, and the avoidance of regulatory
disincentives to the retention of particular assets (decreasing capital adequacy requirements and
increasing lending capacity). Id.; Apcar, More Banks Sell Part of Loan Portfolios, Wall St. J,,
Mar. 4, 1987, at 12, col. 1.
22. Under some circumstances, the originating bank or finance company will provide a guar·
anty against some or all liquidity or credit risk, thereby remaining as an "insurer" intermediary.
See Corrigan, Financial Market Structure: A Longer View, in FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., AN·
NUAL REPORT 1986, 3, 7-8. One impediment to full-scale securitization may be the regulatory
structure itself. For instance, the Investment Company Act of 1940 gives favorable treatment to
pools of mortgages and receivables, but not to commercial loans. See Financial Restructuring:

Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1985) (testimony of Stephen
Friedman).
23. See Scott, supra note 5, at 20-36.
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financial soundness of banking institutions, i.e., the prevention of bank
failures. 24 The regulatory motivation here is two-fold: (1) to protect,
as a political end in itself, depositors who otherwise might not be able
to assess the risk of failures on their own, and (2) more instrumentally,
to encourage deposits by those who might otherwise be discouraged by
the risk of failure, leading to an expansion of available credit through
the banking system and, in the end, economic growth. The soundness
objective has been pursued in a number of ways: 25 restrictions on insider transactions that might involve overreaching, portfolio restrictions that prohibit banks from assuming too much risk, capital
adequacy rules, and - importantly for present purposes - regulation
designed to prevent "undue" competition among banks, which might
threaten their financial stability. These strategies have been supplemented by a system of insurance for smaller depositors, in effect since
1933.26
The history of limits on the interest rates that could be paid to
depositors, known administratively as Reg. Q,27 clearly illustrates how
a changed marketplace structure thwarted what had before been an
apparently successful form of regulation. By prohibiting banks from
paying interest on checking accounts, and severely limiting the rate for
time deposits below market levels, federal regulatory authorities for a
long time virtually guaranteed banks a profitable spread between their
income and their cost of funds. In this noncompetitive environment,
bank failure was exceedingly rare absent affirmative management
dishonesty. 2 s
Two developments combined to upset this strategy. One was the
substantial growth in bank borrowing from other financial institutions
in the various money markets at unregulated rates. The second was an
erosion of the regulated deposit base. By the mid-1970s, the difference
between the Reg. Q ceiling and what the unregulated market was pay24. See Clark, supra note 9, at 25-26.
25. For an overview of these particular techniques, see generally id.; E. SYMONS & J. WHITE,
BANKING LAW (2d ed. 1984).
26. Deposits are insured up to $100,000. To the extent that the foregoing regulatory strategies are based on the goal of promoting depositor confidence in the banking system, they are
redundant if insurance by itself achieves this end. In many respects, the forms of regulation
designed to promote soundness are really protective devices for the insurance fund - an effort by
the insurer (the government-controlled fund) to control its own risk.
27. See Banks and Banking, Interest on Deposits, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1987).
28. This strategy was coupled with a policy of limited entry. See Scott, In Quest of Reason:
The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1975). Limits
on competition, of course, were not altogether benign. Consumers bore various indirect costs,
such as those associated with reduced efficiency. For a discussion of some of these costs, see De
Alessi, The Economics ofProperty Rights: A Review of the Evidence, in 2 RES. L. & EcoN. l, 2223 (1980); see also Clark, supra note 9, at 34-40.
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ing for funds was, because of high inflation, uncomfortably large. This
permitted the emerging money market fund industry - not engaged
in the banking business as legally understood and therefore not subject
to any rate regulation - to attract billions of dollars of funds out of
the banking system entirely. 29 What had been an effort to promote the
financial soundness of the banking system forced banks instead to
stand helpless in the face of competition from "nonbanks." In 1980,
Congress was forced to phase out Reg. Q, thus effectively mandating
payment of market rates of interest, so as to remove the competitive
disadvantage. In the process it eliminated the soundness protection
that had theretofore been seen as desirable regulatory policy, and substantially increased the level of risk faced by commercial banks in their
traditional activity by reducing the expected spread between costs and
income. 30 Once close substitutes for bank deposits became publicly
available as a result of the marketplace transition, allowing consumers
with their savings dollars to opt out of the banking system, the existing
form of regulation was impossible to sustain.
This in turn had an important second-level effect. Whereas regulatory strategies such as product-line restrictions (including Glass-Steagall) could once be justified as rules designed to prevent banks from
taking on lines of business that were inherently more risky than the
protected business of borrowing and lending, those restrictions now
operated to force banks to operate in a relatively undiversified fashion
in what had become a high-risk business. 31 Moreover, other developments have combined to exacerbate the problem. The commercialpaper and securitized-asset markets now offer effective substitutes for
traditional bank financing. Any policy of strict separation would preclude banks from engaging in activities that are not substantially dif29. See s. REP. No. 378, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1979); E. ROUSSAKJS, COMMERCIAL
BANKING IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 72-78 (1984).
30. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 204, 94 Stat. 103 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1980 & Supp. 1987)). The
phase-out mandated by the Act was completed in 1985. For a general discussion, see Note,
Markets for Money - Does the Garn St. Germain Money Market Deposit Account Overcompete
With Mutual Funds?, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1129 (1983).
31. There is some evidence that banks that have been able to diversify their income base
away from traditional activities have fared substantially better in recent years than those that
have not. See Schmitt, As Big Banks Prosper in a Profit Recovery, Smaller Ones Languish, Wall
St. J., June 19, 1986, at 1, col. 6. That, of course, is not inevitable; adding risk to risk can simply
compound exposure. For an excellent study of diversification and its relation to risk, see Li tan,
Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product Deregulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(1985); see also Edwards, Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspectfres on the
Glass-Steagall Act, in THE DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 273
(L. Goldberg & L. White eds. 1979) [hereinafter DEREGULATION]; Boyd & Graham, Risk Regu·
lation, and Bank Holding Company Expansion into Nonbanking, 10 FED. RES. BANK OF MINNE·
APOLlS Q. REV. 2 (1986). For a study of diversification that questions its role in risk reduction,
see Wall, Nonbank Activities and Risk, 71 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 19 (1986),
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ferent in economic function from their core business, even though the
stress is now on risk transfer (and the necessary marketing effort to
accomplish this) rather than risk assumption. Such separation would
in tum foreclose sources of income that might compensate for the
losses that result from the restructured marketplace - potentially, a
safety and soundness-decreasing effect. 32
2. Dispersion of Economic Power
A second rationale underlying much of banking regulation over
the course of history has been a desire to decentralize control over
capital, to avoid undue concentration of economic power in a "handful" of large financial institutions. This objective finds expression in a
host of regulatory strategies. Branching and interstate banking restrictions, as well as prohibitions on bank expansion into "nonbank" lines
of business, are significant examples. 33 To some extent, this objective
is based on a fear of financial "bigness" in itself; it also rests on concerns about potential conflicts of interest and anticompetitive practices
in the industry (e.g., tying arrangements, cross-subsidization)34 in the
event of severe concentration.
The impact of technology on the ability to pursue this objective is
also clear. As noted earlier, an emerging feature of the restructured
marketplace is the absence of effective geographic barriers to entry in
light of the ability to communicate and transact over long distances.
Large banks, and competing nonbank institutions, have developed
means of attracting deposit accounts and making both consumer and
commercial loans without running afoul of legal restrictions currently
in effect. 35 These developments are leading to substantially greater
concentration in at least some markets.
3.

Channeling

Probably the most underestimated recurrent political goal in banking regulation has been that of influencing the use of funds in the :financial system. Both legislatively and administratively, strategies
32. See note 20 supra.
33. See Clark, The Regulation ofFinancial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 789, 83536 (1979). Clark refers to this as a "Zaibatsu" risk, after the Japanese experience. The theory is
that by foreclosing financial institutions from various geographic or product markets their
growth (and thus influence) will be limited.
34. These individual potential abuses are specifically unlawful, either pursuant to particular
banking law statutes (such as the anti-tying statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1985)) or the antitrust
laws generally. The anticoncentration strategies merely supplement these. For a criticism of
these strategies, see Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301 (1987).
35. See note 20 supra.
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have emerged that explicitly or implicitly purport to prefer one use of
funds over another. 36 The development and protection through regulation of the savings and loan industry has been a way of channeling
capital from savers to homeowners (and the real estate industry generally) via mortgage lending. 37 Branching and holding-company expansion restraints are at least in part premised on the desire to promote
"local" use of "local" deposits. Restrictions on product expansion
have been justified by the need to assure that banks will concentrate
their resources on commercial lending - their "special" economic
function 38 - rather than other more speculative forms of investment.
Here, the effect of technology-induced marketplace change is both
obvious and subtle. Even small institutions now have the ability to
seek out, with low search and transaction costs, both capital and investment opportunities on a worldwide basis. The assumption that a
locally controlled bank will naturally concentrate its resources on
community reinvestment - perhaps never entirely accurate - becomes all the more anachronistic as the cost of other investments diminishes. And the problem is compounded as geographic barriers to
entry are reduced by remote banking activities. 39
The indirect effects are even more significant. As wealthier consumers have found a range of close substitutes for bank deposits (e.g.,
money market funds and cash management accounts), any regulatory
restrictions that put banks at a competitive disadvantage in attracting
depositors actually defeat the channeling policy by causing some funds
to leave the banking system altogether. 40 The experience of the sav36. A fairly recent attempt to allocate credit directly was a bill introduced in Congress in
1975 that would have specified what lending priorities were appropriate and what were not. See

generally Hearing on H.R. 212 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House
Comm. on Banking, Cu"ency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Most strategies in this
direction are more subtle.
37. While Reg. Q was effective as a limit on interest rates paid to depositors, savings and
loans were permitted to pay a somewhat higher rate than commercial banks - clearly a channel·
ing device.
38. There remains a substantial political interest in preserving a market structure that has
entities devoted primarily to the provision of commercial credit. See, e.g., Corrigan, supra note
22, at 17-21; R.EsTRUCTURING FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 21, at 137, 251-54. A statistic
provoking concern in this regard, from 1984, is that less than 10% of the funds of 47% of all
commercial banks were invested in commercial loans. Id. at 252.
39. It has thus become necessary for Congress to supplement this localism-oriented form of
regulation with a more specific one, the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905
(1985), which purports to force banks to give adequate attention to local credit needs. See generally McCluskey, The Community Reinvestment Act: Is It Doing the Job?, 100 BANKING L.J. 33
(1983); Booth & Smith, The Impact of the Community Reinvestment Act on Branching Activity of
Financial Institutions, 15 J. BANK RES. 123 (1984).
40. An individual who chooses to place funds in a money market fund gives only initial
control of the capital to the managers of the fund. When the fund buys securities, payment goes
to the seller, who might then deposit that money in a bank. In this sense, the idea that funds
leave the banking system may be overstated. Nonetheless, the bank in which the funds might
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ings and loan industry in the late 1970s - when institutions faced a
large loss of consumer funds and more than half were at least technically insolvent - is attributable in large part to the combination of
interest rate restrictions placed on savings accounts and limitations
designed to force savings and loans to channel their assets to the housing market only.
4. Federalism
Separate from the three foregoing regulatory objectives is one that
can be explained only in historical terms. State authority to charter
banks, and a federal commitment to nothing more than concurrent
power, has long been assumed - first as a matter of constitutional
law, 41 then (once it was clear that Congress could preempt the field) as
an ingrained and jealously guarded practice. The desire to preserve
the "dual system of banking" - notwithstanding the difficulties it creates for effective regulation - finds expression in branching and interstate banking restrictions, as well as in numerous specific regulatory
provisions governing national banks whereby standard-setting authority is delegated to the various states.
Structural change in the banking market has severely compromised this goal as well. A useful illustration is the experience with
respect to usury rates. Federal law subjects national banks to the rate
ceilings set by the state in which they are "located."42 This regulation,
designed to preserve competitive equality among state and national
banks in each particular jurisdiction, was workable so long as the consumer lending market was essentially local. The dramatic growth of
the credit card industry in the 1960s and 1970s has changed that, by
allowing nationwide extension of credit (utilizing sophisticated communications and record-keeping technology) by banks physically located in only one state. In 1978 the Supreme Court held, quite
sensibly, that the usury rate of the state of the lender's home office
governed such extension of credit, regardless of where the loan was
actually made. 43 That meant, however, that the state with the clearest
interest in protection of the particular borrower had lost the ability to
govern the transaction. South Dakota and Delaware quickly seized
upon the opportunity to take advantage of the ruling by deregulating
otherwise have been deposited has lost its opportunity to use the funds, along with the resulting
profit.
41. For an older analysis, see Breckinridge, Constitutionality ofFederal Branch Bank Legislation, 19 ILL. L. REV. 629 (1925). A recent view sympathetic to regulatory federalism is Miller,
The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1987).
42. 12 u.s.c. § 85 (1985).
43. Marquette Natl. Bank v. First of Omaha Ser. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).

686

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:672

interest rates and other banking functions in order to attract banks
and credit card companies that operate solely on an "export" basis. 44
As in corporation law, the practical effect has been to force competing
states to deregulate similarly, or face a loss of that segment of the
banking business. Whatever federalism interest once justified this regulatory strategy has no utility whatsoever in an era of "remote" consumer lending. The same sort of breakdown will occur in bank
regulation generally over time if remote full-service banking becomes
the norm in some or all segments of the market. There is little doubt
that Delaware and others are prepared to take the lead on broaderscale deregulation as well, absent federalization of bank regulation.
And even this may not be enough; the internationalization of the
banking and capital markets is likely to provide both borrower and
depositor choices that will thwart even comprehensive national regulatory strategies.45
5. Summary

The four foregoing regulatory objectives are by no means independent of each other; many strategies, like branching restrictions,
are justified by a combination of some or all of the goals. Nor is the
list complete. Other social policies historically have been pursued via
banking regulation (e.g., equal credit opportunity, anti-redlining, etc.),
and the need for administrative convenience by itself explains why
some strategies exist in the form they do. Moreover, some banking
regulation undoubtedly was either originally intended as or has
evolved into little more than special-interest protectionism, whatever
the justifications publicly given for it.46 These four objectives are,
however, the dominant legitimate - if not necessarily wise47 - goals
44. For a description of the aftermath of Marquette, see Eckman, The Delaware Consumer
Credit Bank Act and ''Exporting" Interest Under Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 39 Bus. LAW. 1264 (1984). On South Dakota's position, as described by its governor, see Janklow, South Dakota and Financial Deregulation,
BANKERS MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 32. See generally Frankel, The Dual State-Federal Regulation of Financial Institutions~ A Policy Proposal, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 53 (1987).
45. There is little doubt that the growth of the so-called Eurodollar market and the alternative financing vehicles offered abroad have provoked much rethinking of American banking regu·
lation. For example, pressure to revise the Glass-Steagall Act comes at least in part from the
recognition that foreign banks and bank holding companies have far greater securities powers
than their American counterparts (at least as they operate domestically), leaving the latter at a
competitive disadvantage in world-wide financing. See Wallison, The Statutory and Policy Underpinnings of United States Bank Securities Activities Abroad, 4 B.U. INTL. L.J. 117 (1986).
Conversely, the fact that American financial institutions operate abroad without being subject to
the Act - without, to this point, causing serious problems - points out the weakness in much of
the Act's justification.
46. See J. HAWKE, CoMMENTARIES ON BANKING REGULATION 303-08 (1985).
47. Nothing in the foregoing discussion is necessarily meant either as an endorsement or a
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underlying the prevailing system of banking regulation, and banking
law cannot be understood except by reference to them.
To generalize: the impact of structural marketplace change on
these regulatory objectives can be seen by observing that each of them
works only if a discrete number of localized market participants has
exclusive province over the business of banking in its particular market. At one time, that was by and large a valid assumption, and much
of the statutory language that today governs banking law was written
under its influence. Change the assumption to some degree, in light of
the new opportunities for entry into the traditional product and geographic banking markets, and those strategies become less effective,
perhaps even counterproductive. Continued adherence to original intent then offers little more than foolish consistency. This is the insight
that complicates the task of courts faced with interpreting the older
statutes, and that tempts them to update. This article now turns to
two of the primary sources of such temptation.

II.

INTERPRETING THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT

The portion of the Banking Act of 1933 known as the Glass-Steagall Act, 48 dealing with the securities activities of banks, is of obvious
importance in the process of marketplace transition. As the preceding
discussion has shown, two characteristics of the altered market are the
consumer's ability to shift funds rapidly among banking and investment accounts and the availability of new financial products covering
the entire risk/return spectrum; there is little reason to park substantial funds in a relatively low-yield deposit account awaiting future use,
in light of the attractive alternatives currently available. The rational
consumer's inclination, given lowered search and transaction costs, is
to expand his or her portfolio of investments. By apparently erecting a
wall of separation between banking and the securities business, however, the Glass-Steagall Act has limited the ability of commercial
banks to offer consumers the full range of higher-risk, higher-yield secriticism of these goals. Without question, some (like the soundness objective) are compelling,
with debate only about the means of achieving them. On the other hand, strong arguments can
be made that they often mask protectionism and impose significant regulatory costs on consumers and society generally. See Clark, supra note 9, at 34-40, 48-58, 79-85.
48. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)). For a
variety of views on the Act in contemporary perspective, see Norton, Up Against "The Wall'~·
Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated ("Reregulated") Banking Environment, 42
Bus. LAW. 327 (1987); Clark & Saunders, Glass-Steagall Revised: The Impact on Banks, Capital
Markets, and the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811 (1980); Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some
Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L.J. 631 (1980); Huertas, An Economic Brief Against GlassSteagall, 15 J. BANKING RES. 148 (1984); DEREGULATION, supra note 31, at 273-353; Orbe,
Glass-Steagall: Lest We Forget, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (1983).
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curities to fill out the portfolio. In contrast, securities firms - traditional specialists in this end of the portfolio spectrum - have been
able to move much closer to the full range via the money market fund,
very much a deposit account substitute. At the same time, the line
between commercial lending and securities distributions has blurred
considerably. Thus, a competitive imbalance exists, leading the banking industry to test as severely as possible the Act's outer limits.
The Glass-Steagall Act is in four sections. Section 16 limits the
securities activities of banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System (including all national banks) to purchasing and selling securities solely upon the order and for the account of their customers not investing for their own account or underwriting issues of any stock
except as specified in the statute.49 Section 20 prohibits affiliations between a member bank and any entity "engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution" of securities. so
Section 21 prohibits entities engaged in the securities business from
engaging at the same time in the business of receiving deposits.st Finally, section 32 bars director and management interlocks between
member banks and entities primarily engaged in the securities
business. s2
A.

The Supreme Court and Glass-Steagal/'s Purpose

The starting point for a modern intellectual history of the GlassSteagall Act is Investment Company Institute v. Camp, s3 the first major Supreme Court case to construe the Act's restrictions on bank
powers - a case that, significantly, was not decided until nearly forty
years after the law's enactment. Camp considered the legality of a
proposal by First National City Bank to establish and market to the
public a collective investment fund. Customers would be solicited to
purchase interests in the fund; the bank would pool the money so invested and purchase and sell securities therewith, which would be held
for the benefit of (and income and gains distributed to) the investors.
The bank would earn a sizable fee for administering the fund. In this
sense, the program was the functional equivalent of an open-end investment company, i.e., a mutual fund, and was no doubt intended by
the bank to be competitive in that market. It was an early step into
49. See the seventh provision of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1985), made applicable to state chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System by 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1985).
50. 12 u.s.c. § 377 (1985).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 378a (1985).
52. 12 u.s.c. § 78 (1985).
53. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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the transitional marketplace, motivated by the renewed popularity of
the stock market during the 1960s.s4
In reversing a determination by the Comptroller that the proposed
fund was simply an extension of the trust powers long assumed in the
banking industry, the Court established a fundamental interpretive
principle for Glass-Steagall. In its view, Congress effected the total
separation of commercial and investment banking out of concern for
bank soundness, fearing a variety of adverse consequences to individual banks and the banking system as a whole if banks were permitted
to remain in the securities business. Invoking a traditional "purposive" approach to interpretation, the Court indicated that judicial determinations under the Act should therefore be based on whether a
particular proposal implicates these same concerns. To this end, the
Court acknowledged that the City Bank proposal would not put any
bank deposits or capital at risk. Nevertheless, it determined that the
proposal was unlawful because it posed a series of more "subtle
hazards" 55 to bank safety and soundness of the sort that caused Congress to effect a complete separation of commercial and investment
banking.
At this crucial point in the Court's opinion, the reasoning begins to
fall of its own weight, for its historical explanation for why divorce
was compelled - its touchstone for statutory interpretation - is less
than convincing. A primary set of concerns articulated by the Court,
54. One of the interesting features of Camp is the Court's resolution of the issue of standing
to challenge the Comptroller's ruling. The prevailing test required not only injury in fact but a
determination that those bringing suit were at least arguably part of the class of persons that
Congress was seeking to benefit or protect through enactment. Under a strict reading of the
"zone of interests" test, members of the securities industry should not have had standing to sue
the Comptroller if the sole purpose of the legislation was to protect bank soundness or the health
of the banking system. The Court, however, dismissed the standing question with a simple citation to previous cases where members of competing industry groups had been granted standing
to challenge the Comptroller's rulings with respect to bank subsidiary powers in their fields.
Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970)
{per curiam). In those cases, however, the Court had been able to find in the legislative history of
a completely different provision, the Bank Service Corporation Act, an articulation of concern
for nonbank competitors who might be put at an unfair competitive disadvantage were banks
allowed to enter particular fields. Absent an articulation of similar concern in the history of the
Glass-Steagall Act - which will be demonstrated below - this precedent is completely distinguishable. Yet since Camp the question of securities industry standing to challenge bank expansion under Glass-Steagall has not seriously been questioned; it has been raised, but lower courts
have felt bound by Camp to reject the argument. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593
F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1984), revd. on other grounds, 793 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 422 (1986). A recent Supreme Court decision involving the battle between the banking
and securities industries with respect to branching powers under the McFadden Act adopts once
again a very broad approach to the zone of interests test. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 107
S. Ct. 750 (1987). On the extent to which courts really do inquire into legislative history under
the zone of interests test, see Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, 1983
DUKE

L.J. 447.

55. 401 U.S. at 630.
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for example, had to do with potential conflicts of interest. A bank
with substantial investments in an issuer might, for example, be
tempted to misuse its lending or trust authority to support the issuer,
or a distribution of its securities, through bad investments or bad
loans. 56 That is a legitimate concern, and examples of such abuse were
given in the Act's legislative history. 57 But it is difficult to believe that
Congress would have effected a radical separation of two industries
based on that concern alone when the problem could so easily have
been addressed by regulation, well short of divorce. 58
A second set of concerns the Court identified, relating to the
bank's public identification with its securities affiliate and the effect on
confidence in the bank's soundness if the investment affiliate was doing
poorly, seems even less compelling. 59 Not only does it assume that the
public is misinformed about the relationship between the affiliates, but
contemporaneous adoption of deposit insurance makes the scenario
unlikely. 60 Again, this seems a weak motivating factor for such an
aggressive legislative initiative.
The final set of concerns related to a fear that a "salesman's interest" in particular securities might compromise the role of the banker
as a faithful servant of its customers. 61 What this has to do with bank
soundness is by no means clear; it is highly unlikely, for instance, that
consumers would withdraw their money from the banking system because of some perceived conflict. Once more, the suggestion that this
in fact led Congress to compel divorce is implausible.
The relative frailty of the justifications given by the Court for what
Congress was seeking to accomplish through Glass-Steagall makes it
an unsatisfying opinion. Transitional marketplace or not, it offers no
persuasive answer to the question of why, given the ability to regulate
56. 401 U.S. at 631.
57. In fact only one instance of a bank failure related to bank securities activities was discussed in the legislative history (that of the Bank of the United States), and that instance in·
volved grave personal misconduct by bank insiders. 401 U.S. at 629-30. The use of bank funds to
"throw good money after bad" is not rational; certainly, the temptation to do so pursuant to an
investment banking relationship is no greater - probably less - than in the situation where the
bank has a long-standing commercial banking relationship with the borrower. A more serious
concern, however, might arise if bank officers or directors had a personal interest in the success
of the securities affiliate or the issuer of the securities.
58. In proposing repeal of the prohibition on bank underwriting of corporate securities in
1935, Senator Glass offered a set of simple regulatory restrictions which, in his view, would easily
suffice to prevent abuse. See 79 CoNG. R.Ec. 11,933-34 (1935). For a recent proposal to control
these possible abuses through regulation, see Note, Restrictions on Bank Undenvriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal/or More Permissive Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 720 (1984).
59. 401 U.S. at 631.
60. As the drafters of the separation provision were actively opposed to deposit insurance
and hoped to defeat it, the legislative history does not assume its existence.
61. 401 U.S. at 631-33.
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proposed bank securities activity, Congress would want instead to bar
banks from this field completely. This lingering dissatisfaction - that
there must be something more to the story - is important, for it raises
the possibility that the subsequent permissive development of the case
law is a product of this unanswered question, rather than any conscious judicial updating of the statute. Along these lines, a number of
influential writers have concluded that the ostensible rationale for the
legislation must be a mere pretext. Instead, they contend, the Act is
simple special-interest legislation on behalf of the investment banking
community. Noted economist George Benston has written, for example, that "the evidence supports the belief that the investment bankers
and underwriters were concerned about severe competition from
banks and bank affiliates and sought (successfully in 1933) to eliminate
these competitors."62 In his 1984 Supreme Court foreword in the
Harvard Law Review, Professor (now Judge) Frank Easterbrook criticized a 1984 Glass-Steagall Act decision as "in several ways ... the
most troubling economic decision of the Term," for failing to take into
account the interest of the plaintiff, the Securities Industry Association, in claiming the "spoils of victory" in the legislative process. 63
Similarly, though urging an interpretive approach designed to thwart
the power of special interests, Professor Jonathan Macey contends
that Glass-Steagall was in fact enacted at the behest of the investment
bankers. 64 If this more accurately describes Congress' motivation, then
Camp's weakness, and all the subsequent twists in the Act's construction, are understandable but intellectually insignificant, for statutory
interpretation based on misleading statements of intent is doomed to
incoherence. For this reason, and because at least under an interpretive approach like Easterbrook's such "deals" are to be given controlling effect, the historical issue requires further consideration.
1. Intent Reconsidered
Determining who was responsible for the separation of commercial
62. Benston, Federal Regulation of Banking: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 13 J.

BANK REs. 216, 222 (1983).
63. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, supra note l, at 57. Easterbrook's
view is that, by analogy to private contracts, courts should seek to carry out the true (not simply
ostensible) intent of the legislature, even if that means in some cases effectuating a raw political
"deal" between legislators and some special-interest group. He does not go so far as to determine
that the plaintiff in the case in question was in fact the victor with respect to the issue before the
Court - only that the Court should have inquired in that direction.
64. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986) [hereinafter Macey, An Interest Group
Modelj; Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of
Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. l, 15-21 (1984) [hereinafter Macey, Special Interest Groups].
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and investment banking - and why - resembles solving a murder
mystery in which all the evidence is circumstantial. The claims made
by Benston, Easterbrook, and Macey are based on deduction rather
than discovered fact: convinced that there is no rational economic
policy to support a wall of separation between banking and the securities industry (as opposed simply to oversight and regulation of the securities activities of banks), they conclude that the only possible
alternative explanation is a skewing of the political process by those
who later turned out to be immense beneficiaries of the statute.
Admittedly, private investment bankers had a strong motive for
seeking a wall of separation. Prior to World War I, investment banking in America was the province of a small, closely-knit group of Wall
Street institutions, led in influence and prestige by such firms as J.P.
Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co. 65 In the century's first decades,
however, larger banks began to establish securities affiliates as means
for engaging in the sale and distribution of securities, generally
bonds. 66 The earliest securities efforts were justified by the need to
provide wealthier bank customers with "full-service" financial assistance; often, these services were part of the bank's trust activities, separately incorporated in order to take advantage of the more liberal
powers granted under state corporation (as opposed to state or federal
banking) law. In the 1920s, this emphasis changed. As the public's
appetite for securities grew, many large corporations switched their
sources of funding from bank loans to new issues of stock. Both to
replace the loss of income from this transition, and to take advantage
of the profit opportunities from the popularity of securities distributions generally, these bank affiliates expanded both the nature and
scope of their activities - now competing fully with the private investment bankers. 67 Drawing on their large capital bases and networks of
affiliated institutions, they were successful competitors. By the end of
the decade, bank securities affiliates - most importantly, those of
Chase National Bank and National City Co. of New York - were
sponsoring over half of all new securities issues. 68 This trend naturally
provoked expressions of concern from the private investment bankers,
65. See V. CAROSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA (1970); s. HAYES, A. SPENCE, &
D. MARKS, COMPETITION IN THE INVESTMENT BANKING INDUSTRY 5-28 (1983). Another
useful history of investment banking is found in the court's exhaustive opinion in an antitrust
case brought against the investment banking industry, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
66. See W. PEACH, THE SECURmES AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS (The Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science, series LVIII, No. 3, 1941).
67. See W. PEACH, supra note 66, at 24; see also Osterweis, Security Affiliates and Security
Operations of National Banks, 11 HARV. Bus. REV. 124, 126 (1933).
68. S. KENNEDY, THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933, at 212 (1973).
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noted most clearly at the annual convention of the Investment Ban1cers Association in 1929.69 No doubt, doing away with commercial
ban1c competition was an attractive thought.
Motive notwithstanding, the circumstantial case against the investment ban1cers as a special interest group responsible for the divorce of
commercial and investment ban1cing is untenable. One obvious weakness is that New Deal ban1cing legislation has, among historians and
political scientists, been one of the most studied and commented upon
of all economic subjects. Yet none of the major studies cites specialinterest pleading as a major factor in the passage of the Ban1cing Act of
1933.70 Nor does one find allegations to that effect in the recollections
or biographies of those close to the legislative process at the time, 71
and this is significant. While those actually responsible for the Act
might well try to hide any less than public-regarding motivation, the
many who opposed the legislation certainly had reason to publicize its
true origins.
More important than the absence of hard evidence, however (for
history has certainly known cover-ups), is the existence of a persuasive
alternative explanation for the deed. By all accounts, the legislative
history begins with Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, principal drafter
of the Federal Reserve Act in 1914, and the preeminent congressional
authority on the business of ban1cing. 72 Glass, as influenced by his
principal advisor, Professor H. Parker Willis of Columbia University,
was an old-fashioned ban1cing theorist; he believed that the proper role
of a commercial ban1c was lending evidenced by short-term commercial paper. So long as ban1cers concentrated on this function, the
money supply was subject to a natural discipline. This "real bills doctrine" - today discredited - was an underlying philosophy of the
Federal Reserve System, and Glass believed that it would make future
long-term economic depressions unlikely. 73
69. See W. PEACH, supra note 66, at 103-04.
70. See, e.g., W. PEACH, supra note 66; Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment
Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971).
71. See, for example, the account of Glass' principal advisor, H. Parker Willis, in H. WILLIS
& J. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION (1933), and of Franklin Roosevelt's principal advisor
Raymond Maley, in R. MOLEY, THE FIRST NEW DEAL (1966).
72. For a personalized account of Glass' interest in banking, see R. SMITH & N. BEASLEY,
CARTER GLASS 296-308, 327-38 (1939). Study of this aspect of the Act's history is aided by the
fact that Glass' private papers and correspondence are indexed and available at the Alderman
Library of the University of Virginia.
73. See Perkins, supra note 70, at 501-03; Huertas, supra note 48, at 149-50. Willis has
provided one of the most complete contemporaneous histories of the Glass-Steagall Act, including substantial commentary on the politics of the legislation. H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra
note 71, at 56-91; see also Willis, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 697
(1935).
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Glass was extremely troubled during the later 1920s by extensive
bank lending to finance securities purchases, not because he was opposed to the stock market itself, but because he believed that such
lending was taking money away from local businesses in need of
credit. He sought to use his influence to pressure the Federal Reserve
and the bankers to adopt policies of restraint on brokers' call loans
and margin lending, but he was not successful. 74 Research under his
direction a few years later uncovered perhaps the most significant statistic leading to eventual passage of the legislation - by 1930, some
forty-one percent ofall commercial bank assets were invested in securities or securities-related loans. 75 It was during this period that Glass
formed a negative view of bank securities affiliates, which he considered a major source of the temptation to divert bank funds away from
commercial uses. Indeed, he took personal offense at the deliberate
and pointed failure of the officers of the largest banks with such affiliates (particularly Charles Mitchell of National City Bank) to adopt a
program of voluntary restraint with respect to brokers' call loans. 76
With the stock market crash, the onset of the Depression, and the
rise in both business and bank failures at the beginning of the new
decade, Glass felt vindicated in his long-standing beliefs about the
business of banking. He was given a vehicle for exploring the issue in
late 1930 when the Senate, reacting to public pressure, resolved to
hold hearings on the relationship between the banking system and the
recent events. Glass and Willis prepared a "discussion draft" bill that,
on the securities affiliate issue, had two alternatives - complete divorce of investment and commercial banking, or regulation and inspection of bank securities affiliates. 77 At the time, Glass had no
confidence that anything as radical as complete separation could pass
through Congress. Though he apparently favored such an approach
and believed that the public did so as well, inclusion of the strong
alternative was probably just a bargaining chip. 1s
In the first set of hearings, the idea of divorce was supported in
testimony by such persons as the New York State Superintendent of
74. See Glass, The Federal Reserve System Grossly Misused, AM. REV. OF REVIEWS, Sept.
1928, at 257.
75. Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking Systems: Hearings on S. Res. 71
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 999
(1931) [hereinafter Hearings].
76. See J. Lyle, The United States Senate Career of Carter Glass, 1920-1933 at 145-48 (1974)
{Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, University of South Carolina); J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 7 (1982).
77. See H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra note 71, at 68-69.
78. See Perkins, supra note 70, at 505.
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Banking, the chairman of the board of the General Electric Company,
and Professor William Z. Ripley of Harvard.79 It was opposed by a
series of commercial bankers, led by Charles Mitchell of National City
Bank and Albert Wiggin of Chase National Bank. Neither the White
House nor the banking regulators actively supported Glass' effort.
At this point, there was little likelihood of legislation coming from
the Republican-controlled Senate, and little interest in Glass' ideas in
the House. But as the Depression lengthened, public demand for Congress to "do something" and a growing opinion that bankers were
somehow to blame for economic conditions kept the issue alive.
Though apparently willing to compromise, Glass insisted that the
proper response was divorce, along with liberalization of branch banking powers and increased Federal Reserve Board control over lending
for "nonproductive" (i.e., speculative) uses. He was strongly opposed
to more intrusive reforms, particularly the idea of federal deposit insurance, a politically attractive idea being pushed by the more populist
elements of Congress. 80
The 1932 Democratic platform included (at Glass' insistence) a
call for the complete separation of commercial and investment banking, and Glass believed that Roosevelt's election enhanced the prospects for his bill's passage. Ironically, however, Roosevelt never
pushed the legislation. 81 Instead, two other factors coalesced to result
in enactment. The first was congressional hearings on stock market
practices (the Pecora hearings), which generated much public interest.
During the early part of 1933, these hearings focused on the securities
activities of Mitchell of National City Bank, exposing substantial personal and institutional wrongdoing, and the Morgan bank, which
(while there was no real evidence of criminal misconduct) involved a
pattern of less than high-handed behavior. This expose intensified the
public impression of a harmful tie between the big banks and the stock
market. 82 The second factor was an increase in popular (and thus
79. Hearings, supra note 75 at 183-209, 271-83, 285-322, 353-69, 479-96.
80. A useful history of the Banking Act of 1933, concentrating on the deposit insurance
aspect, is Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of Its Antecedents and Its Purposes, 15 POL. Sci. Q. 181 (1960).
81. Roosevelt was ambivalent about the bill, largely because of his opposition to the idea of
deposit insurance. See F. FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: LAUNCHING THE NEW DEAL
442 (1973).
82. Many historians cite the Pecora hearings as a dominant reason for passage of GlassSteagall. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT-THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL
435-38, 442-45 (1958); Perkins, supra note 70, at 522-23; W. PEACH, supra note 66, at 177-79; J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 76, at 38. A broader view is offered by Willis, who wrote in 1933 that
[t]he changes which had taken place both in the Senate and in the House had led to the
elimination of a banking and financial influence which had been dominant during the pre-
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political) support for deposit insurance, and for the possibility of radical regulation (perhaps nationalization) of the banking industry.
By March 1933 effective industry opposition to the idea of divorce
ended. Having recently replaced Albert Wiggin as chief executive officer of Chase, Winthrop Aldrich announced that he favored the Glass
legislation and that Chase would voluntarily divest itself of its securities affiliate. 83 National City Bank did the same. While Aldrich spoke
publicly in terms of returning banking to its traditional calling, his
motive was probably more political. The large banks (indeed most
banks) vehemently opposed deposit insurance, and worried about
what else the new Congress might have in store for them. By appearing to be recreant in light of the recently exposed abuses, and by aligning with the moderate conservative Glass, they no doubt were simply
seeking to head off more restrictive legislation. In addition, one historian has noted that by 1933 investment banking was not a profitable
business - and with the bad publicity and the political changes in
Washington, there was some doubt as to whether it would ever become so again. 84 Divestment was not only politically wise, but also a
loss-cutting measure; certainly, there were no large profits at the time
to be fought for.
In the end, the populist pressure for deposit insurance was irresistible. Both Glass and the White House ultimately gave in to the forces
led by Congressman Henry Steagall of Alabama, and a compromise
bill was worked out to break what had become a legislative logjam; it
contained an insurance plan as well as the most important measures
that Glass had been pushing. 85 The Banking Act of 1933 was passed
in June and signed by the President.
Thus, there is an explanation for the separation of investment and
commercial banking that does not involve special-interest pressure
ceding regime, but had substituted the domination of other elements which professed a de·
sire for legislation directed against property owners and property-holding in general ••••
H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra note 71, at 98-99. For a view that Charles Mitchell was unfairly blamed in this process, see Huertas & Silverman, Charles E. Mitchell: Scapegoat of the
Crash?, 60 Bus. H1sr. REV. 81 (1986).
83. See w. PEACH, supra note 66, at 157-58; A. JOHNSON, WINTHROP w. ALDRICH: LAW·
YER, BANKER, DIPLOMAT 150-51 (1968). Schlesinger suggests that Aldrich's action was essentially a Rockefeller family assault on the House of Morgan. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 82, at
443. Professor Kennedy suggests that it was largely a "gesture" to restore lost prestige. S. KEN·
NEDY, supra note 68, at 212-13.
84. Perkins, supra note 70, at 522; see also Preston, The Banking Act of 1933, 23 AM. ECON.
REv. 585, 604 (1933). Among the uncertainties was the impact of the imminent Securities Act
on the securities business. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 76, at 76-77.
85. For a discussion of the final days of the legislative history, including Roosevelt's role in
arranging a compromise, see R. MoLEY, supra note 71, at 81; S. KENNEDY, supra note 68, at
220. Even at the last moment, Glass was not at all convinced that his legislation would succeed.
See H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra note 71, at 101.
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from the private investment bankers. For Carter Glass and those closest to this portion of the legislation the principal motivation was pursuit, perhaps more emotional than rational, of the channeling objective
- an attempt to force banks to redirect their resources, efforts, and
energies to the traditional business of commercial and agricultural
lending by foreclosing the securities temptation. 86 If any special interest group was instrumental in this regard, it was probably the smaller
businesses and farmers (not surprisingly, Glass' Virginia constituents)
who considered the unavailability of credit at least partially responsible for their current woes. Many in Congress (and probably Glass as
well), also viewed separation as a politically attractive way of appearing to respond punitively to the bankers' recently exposed excesses. 87
Others saw it as simply part of a legislative package that contained
something far more important, federal deposit insurance.
The conduct of the investment bankers themselves, both before
and after the legislation, provides further evidence against the special
interest theory. By 1930, control of the investment bankers' principal
lobbying arm, the Investment Bankers Association of America, had
fallen to the commercial bankers; its opposition to the Glass bill was,
until the adverse publicity generated by the stock market hearings, intense. 88 Furthermore, the final bill offered by Glass once the effective
opposition ceased had one provision that severely hurt the private
bankers. Prior to 1933, the major investment banking houses obtained
a sizable portion of their capital by accepting deposits from large institutional customers. By prohibiting investment firms from taking deposits, section 21 of the Act dried up much of the capital pool and
compromised the long-standing independence of these firms. 89 Section
21 was apparently written at the urging of (if not by) Winthrop Aldrich of Chase National Bank.9o
86. See Legislation Note, The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 47 HARV. L. REV. 325,
326 (1933). This has not always been emphasized explicitly in the more recent literature, though
it follows logically from the evidence. Cf W. PEACH, supra note 66, at 177. Many of the
passages from the legislative history of the Act quoted in Camp as evidence of a soundness concern are really, when read in context, explicit statements of a channeling motivation. Most notable in this regard is a speech on the floor of the House by Congressman Steagall, which "call[s]
back to the service of agriculture and commerce and industry the bank credit and the bank
service designed by the framers of the Federal Reserve Act." 77 CONG. REc. 3835 (1933),
quoted in Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 632 n.29 (1971).
87. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REc. 4028 (May 23, 1933) (remarks of Rep. Fish).
88. See Perkins, supra note 70, at 496, 519; H. BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL REFORMS 1933-1935, at 65 (1974) (quoting an IBA resolution stating that
the continued "existence of affiliates of banks is necessary for the distribution of securities and
the financing of corporations"}.
89. See V. CAROSO, supra note 65, at 372.
90. This is noted by Aldrich's biographer. See A. JOHNSON, supra note 83, at 150-51, 156.
Obviously, Aldrich was doing some "turf protecting" of his own.
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Even more interesting is the conduct of the investment banking
firms after enactment. One bit of history that on first glance might
seem to support the special interest theory is Carter Glass' fairly close
relationship with the most influential of the private investment firms,
J.P. Morgan. Two Morgan partners, Russell Leffingwell and S. Parker
Gilbert, were Glass' good friends and had been his close advisors as
Secretary of the Treasury. Glass reportedly tried to protect the Morgan interests during the stock market hearings. 91 There, if anywhere,
is the link between Glass and Wall Street and the opportunity for pursuit of monopoly rents. Yet upon passage of the legislation, J.P. Morgan & Co. chose to quit the investment banking business in order to
comply with the law and retain its ability to accept deposits as what is
today Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. Approximately one-third of the
other private investment bankers (including Brown Brothers Harriman and Drexel & Co.) did the same. 92 That seems strange behavior
for a group that had just been successful in obtaining special-interest
legislation on its behalf. In 1935 certain Morgan interests, wishing to
reenter the securities business, did form Morgan Stanley & Co., today
one of the largest investment banking firms. The three Morgan partners who resigned to form the new firm apparently waited to take that
step, however, until it was clear that a 1935 effort in Congress to repeal the portion of Glass-Steagall prohibiting commercial bank underwriting of securities issues - an effort led by Carter Glass - had
failed. 93
2.

Camp and the Traditional Rhetoric of Banking

This rather lengthy consideration of the history of Glass-Steagall
shows that the critics were correct in their suspicion that Camp's
weakness stemmed from its misappreciation of the legislative history,
but wrong in their explanation of what that history showed. Camp
91. See V. CAROSO, supra note 65, at 349.
92. Id. at 372.
93. Contemporaneous accounts suggest that persons in the investment banking business
viewed the formation of Morgan Stanley as a reentry by the House of Morgan into the investment banking field notwithstanding Glass-Steagall, see Investigation of Concentration of Eco-

nomic Power: Hearings on Pub. Res. 113 Before the Temporary National Economic Comm. of the
76th Congress, 16th Cong., 2d Sess. 11,768-69 (1939) (exhibit nos. 1642-43, correspondence between Charles Mitchell and Charles Blyth), raising the possibility that reentry was part of a longterm plan on the part of the Morgan interests. That seems implausible, however. The attempt to
repeal the underwriting prohibition for national banks was probably (given Glass' connections
with Morgan) Morgan-influenced. Publicly Glass urged repeal because, he said, he had been
wrong in his earlier expectation that the investment banking industry would be able to handle the
capital needs of American businesses without commercial bank involvement. See 19 CONG. REC.
11,827, 11,933-94 (1935). The legislative proposal was defeated, in part at least, because of
White House support for the separation policy. See Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to Carter
Glass (Aug. 1935), quoted in H. BURNS, supra note 88, at 171.
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failed to see the Act as an attempt to rechannel financial resources and
energies for the benefit of commerce and agriculture, something that
would happen only if a banker's interests were solely in the successful
operation of the bank itself and thus logically achievable only through
complete separation. The soundness- and conflict-related concerns on
which the Court rested its analysis, though real, were simply part of
the story. In fact, it is likely that had they been Congress' only fears
- had Congress considered securities activities a proper part of the
business of banking - they would have been dealt with by regulation
rather than divorce. Camp's analytical weakness rests in taking these
objectives out of context and promoting them to an interpretive significance they do not merit.
For the development of case law, the rhetoric used in a Supreme
Court opinion is often more important than the opinion's analytical
structure. Language and style have a signaling function; they set a
tone that can thereafter be invoked for purposes of doctrinal continuity when the analysis itself does not compel a particular result.
Here, the Court came closer to mirroring the sentiments of the drafters. The separate sphere to which Carter Glass and his colleagues
consigned commercial banking in 1933 was hardly an unattractive
one. Marketplace entry was limited by law; this was the high point of
concern about overbanking, and of reluctance to grant new charters if
a "sufficient" number of banks was already present. In addition, the
Banking Act of 1933 introduced another regulatory strategy; banks
were prohibited from paying interest on demand deposits and the Federal Reserve Board was given authority to limit the payment of interest on time deposits. This further limited competition in the bank
marketplace and increased the expected profitability of the banking
business. 94 While the securities portion of the Act might well have
been designed to appear to the public as a punishment for excess,
Glass' expectation was probably much more benign. With the wall of
separation in place to reduce temptation (and a Federal Reserve Board
hopefully more sensitive to the risks of stock market speculation),
commercial banks would naturally return to the comfortably profitable business of providing credit for business and agriculture.
This belief is the basis for Camp's dominant rhetorical theme. According to the Court, Congress was of the opinion that the public
should be able to seek financial advice and services from bankers in
this less than fully competitive environment; it should be able to as94. The articulated intent of this provision was to prevent interbank competition that had the
effect of, among other things, causing the movement of funds from smaller "country" banks to
larger city banks - again, a channeling objective.
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sume that its best interests would be protected. The Court believed
that the image of the "prudent and disinterested" 95 banker was lost
when there was promotional pressure to sell a particular investment:
"It is not the slightest reflection on the integrity of the mutual fund
industry to say that the traditions of that industry are not necessarily
the conservative traditions of commercial banking." 96 This is classic
fiduciary language, a view of banks as something of public trustees or a
public utility, a sentiment perhaps justified given the regulation-induced monopolistic conditions in the post-1933 banking marketplace.97 The service role that Carter Glass very much wanted the
commercial bankers to reassume became the sharpest textual image in
Camp. 98
In concluding this critique of Camp, it is worth noting that had the
Court properly described the intent behind Glass-Steagall, and focused
directly on the desire to channel bank funds to productive (i.e., industrial and agricultural) rather than speculative (i.e., stock market) uses,
it might still have decided against the Citibank proposal. Under market conditions prevailing at the time, large-scale marketing of "investment fund" products by banks would probably have encouraged a
shifting of funds from deposit accounts to stock market investment
fund accounts unavailable for lending use, 99 something that likely
would not have pleased the Act's drafters. But nowhere in its opinion
did the Court make reference to that objective. With Camp's weakness, a new stage in statutory evolution had begun.
95. 401 U.S. at 634.
96. 401 U.S. at 637.
97. This sentiment was recognized in a Harvard Law Review note soon after the legislation,
which pointed out that "Senator Glass thought the bankers could be coaxed into regarding their
position as a public trust." Legislation Note, supra note 86, at 326.
98. The Court's rhetorical emphasis makes quite clear that its analytical narrowing oflegisla·
tive purpose was unintended. Passage of time and a restoration of public confidence in the stock
market and the securities business could easily obscure the feelings that prevailed in 1933, espe·
cially with so many different purposes possible. (Professor Radin's classic attack on statutory
intent as a meaningful basis for legal decisionmaking notes that when many different actors in the
legislative process have many different motives in seeking legislation, identifying a particular
intent is impossible. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).) Sound·
ness protection was, during the 1960s, far and away the dominant objective in banking regulation
generally. In this light, the Court's undue emphasis on soundness was predictable.
99. Sophisticated savers, of course, would move their money to a non-bank-affiliated mutual
fund if such a fund seemed a desirable investment. This channeling point assumes, probably
realistically, that the very fact that the bank sponsors and promotes the fund - and provides a
convenient means of shifting money from deposit accounts to fund accounts - would result in
some shifting that otherwise would not occur.
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Rhetoric Transformed: The Beginning of Transitional
Jurisprudence

The second major Supreme Court decision on the securities powers
of banking institutions, Board of Governors v. Investment Company Institute (''!Cl II"), 100 came exactly a decade after Camp. It involved a
relatively narrow issue - whether bank holding company nonbank
subsidiaries could sponsor and advise closed-end investment companies. Closed-end companies differ from the mutual funds involved in
Camp in that they do not continuously sell and redeem their shares;
instead, there is an initial public offering, and perhaps occasional subsequent offerings. Shareholders wishing to dispose of their interests in
the companies must find a purchaser (there are thus organized secondary markets for such shares). The Federal Reserve Board, by rule,
approved bank holding company expansion into this field so long as
distributions were not contemplated in the ordinary course of business, distributions were handled by an unaffiliated underwriter (not
the adviser), there would be no extensions of credit to the company by
the adviser, and affiliated banks in the holding company structure
would refrain from any involvement with sale or distribution of the
company's securities (including expressing any opinion on the advisability of purchasing those securities). 101 In other words, specific restrictions were imposed by rule to regulate each of the "subtle
hazards" identified in Camp.
The Court upheld the Board. By contrast to the purely purposive
reasoning in Camp, the Court's opinion is a study in line-drawing.102
The question before the Court was whether the advisory affiliate
would be engaged in the business of selling, distributing, or underwriting securities. Technically, the answer was no; an unaffiliated company would do the actual selling. But Camp called for a broader
inquiry: Could the affiliation of an investment company advisory firm
and a bank create the sorts of conflicts that Congress ostensibly was
100. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
101. 450 U.S. at 51-52.
102. It emphasized, for example, that only one of the three principal Glass-Steagall sections,
section 20, applies at all when the activity is carried out by an entity legally distinct from the
bank itself, 450 U.S. at 59 n.24 - a holding that by itself authorized a new wave of bank securities activities. Most significant was the recognition that, since section 20 only applies to the
activities of member banks, there was no bar in the Act to the full range of securities activities by
affiliates of state-chartered nonmember banks. See Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, [1986-1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 93,063 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1987), amended, [19861987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 93,197 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 1987). This is
correct as a technical matter; the drafters of the Act believed that they were acting largely to
preserve the Federal Reserve System from abuse and that they substantially lacked power over
the conduct of state-chartered nonmember banks.
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worried about? The Court's answer - a negative one - rested completely on the fact that the Board had adopted rules to control otherwise clear-cut conflicts.
While the Court is no doubt correct that so long as the restrictions
set forth in the Board's regulations are followed there is no real potential for abuse, it nowhere addresses Camp's conclusion that Congress'
decision to force a complete separation of commercial banking and the
securities business was based on a lack of confidence that rules of this
sort would ever be effective in the face of distraction or temptation. 103
Camp's purposive construction of a statute such as Glass-Steagall proceeded in two steps: first, defining in a generic sense the various words
and phrases of the statutory provision (to which "subtle hazard" or
other purposive inquiry is crucial, but not in a case-specific sense); and
second, determining whether the proposed conduct substantially falls
within that generic definition. 104 If it does, it is unimportant that for
this particular applicant the possibility of abuse is remote (or guarded
against). The interpretive approach oftheJCJ II opinion collapses the
two inquiries, standing Camp on its head by determining that so long
as agency rules exist to control abuse, the Act's policy of separation
does not come into play. In effect, the Court transformed Glass-Steagall into a procedural exercise resembling that set forth in the Bank
Holding Company Act for nonbanking activities generally - a process that delegates to the Board the power to expand the powers of
banking institutions incrementally in response to marketplace
changes, so long as there is a reasonable effort to control threats to
bank soundness, conflicts of interest, and potential anticompetitive impact.105 That, however, was precisely the road not taken in Glass103. See Macey, Special Interest Groups, supra note 64, at 23-24. There is no hint in Camp
that had the Comptroller imposed restrictions on the bank's proposed fund (or required that it be
in a separate subsidiary) the result would have been different. Yet that is the implication of the
ICI II reasoning. See note 132 infra.
104. See Note, A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act, 91 YALE L.J. 106
(1981). The question then would have been whether the rendering of advisory services in the
closed-end context makes the bank and/or its affiliate so interested in the selling and distribution
process that conflicts of interest are likely to arise.
105. Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1343(c)(8) (1985), permits the Board to authorize bank holding company expansion into fields so closely related to
banking so as to be a proper incident thereto. Under the prevailing legal standard set forth in
National Courier Assn. v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1975), endorsed
by the Supreme Court in Securities Indus. Assn. v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984),
such expansion is permissible if banks historically have provided such services, if the services are
functionally similar to historical banking services so as to equip the holding company to provide
them particularly well, or if "[b]anks generally provide services that are so integrally related to
the proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized form." 516 F.2d at 1237. This
test essentially permits expansion into product lines that (1) are part of the business of banking as
commonly understood, (2) are the functional equivalent of part of that business, or (3) are demanded by consumers in a bundled form with a product justified under (1) or (2). The effect of

February 1987]

Statutory Obsolescence

703

Steagall.
The Court effected an even more dramatic shift in its rhetorical
emphasis. The image of the public banker, whose interests were supposed to be a world apart from (and immune from the pressures of)
the securities industry and the stock market, disappeared. A normatively neutral blueprint for bank holding companies - showing so far
as possible what sorts of expansion in the securities business are permissible, and what sorts are not - replaced the prophylactic :fiduciary
emphasis in Camp.
What explains this change? Perhaps the Court simply recognized
that Camp's analysis of the separation objective was fragile, and that
there was really no reason, if soundness and potential conflicts were
the only concerns, why such concerns could not be dealt with through
simple rulemaking. But the shift in the opinion's rhetoric indicates
something more fundamental and demands a broader explanation.
Such an explanation may be found in the circumstances of the decade
separating the two Supreme Court decisions, corresponding almost
precisely to the period of technology-induced transition in the structure of the banking marketplace described in Part I of this Article. In
1971, the banking and securities businesses were still largely segmented, the money market fund an insignificant institution to the
banking industry. By 1981, the blurring of the product distinctions
had led to an immense drain of funds from the banking to the securities industry, causing among other things congressional repeal of one
of the basic anticompetitive strategies of banking regulation, Reg. Q's
interest-rate ceilings. The banking industry was by then well into the
transition from a relatively comfortable, less than fully competitive series of geographically discrete markets to a much more integrated, extremely competitive nationwide :financial services marketplace,
requiring a new set of resources and talents - and probably a much
more diversified product base106 - in order to deal with the increased
level of risk.
The new structure of the banking industry makes a complete
anachronism of Camp's fiduciary rhetoric. One doubts that many sophisticated people today see the banker as anything but a businessperson under pressure to sell products and generate profits - not a likely
source of "disinterested investment advice" unless that service is paid
this test is gradually to increase holding company powers as the nature of banking changes over
time. A good illustration of this is the recent expansion of Citicorp into extensive data processing
and software marketing. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors,
745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984), a significant opinion by Judge (now Justice) Scalia.
106. See Part I.B.1. supra. One such product line might well involve sponsorship of closedend mutual funds.
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for. Camp's reference to the "conservative traditions of commercial
banking," in contrast to the promotional emphasis of the securities
industry, rings hollow if consumers treat the :financial services products offered by the two industries as in fact fungible. The monopoly
rents that once could be appropriated by the industry have in many
respects disappeared in the face of vigorous competition, and with
them the normative basis for expecting any compensating sense of
public responsibility. It is reasonable to suppose, then, that ICI II's
literalism and rhetorical neutrality stem from a fundamentally different understanding of the business of banking than that held by the
drafters of Glass-Steagall or the panel that decided Camp, and that its
shift in both interpretive method and style was meant to be a pruning
of a now obsolete statute - in other words, a subtle exercise in transitional jurisprudence.
C.

The Transitional Rhetoric Extended

The transitional thrust and tone of !CI II began another stage in
statutory evolution. This section will look at three current controversies under the Act - bank brokerage activity, the marketing of individual retirement accounts, and ownership of banks by securities
brokerage firms - where legal decisionmaking has reflected the new
style of interpretation.
1. Brokerage Activity
In the wake of ICI II, the commercial banking industry expanded
to provide customers with securities brokerage services, through the
bank itself, a subsidiary, or a holding company affiliate. 107 To date,
most of this expansion has been in the form of so-called discount brokerage - execution of customer-directed transactions, on an agency
basis, without investment research or advice as to particular securities.
One attractive "portfolio" feature of this line of business is that it offers increased earnings to the bank or the holding company at times
when the stock market is strong and customer funds are moving out of
deposit accounts for securities purchases. 108
107. Even before the Court's decision, there had been a gradual expansion in this direction,
particularly in the area of automatic investment services. See New York Stock Exchange v.
Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 932 (1978); Lybecker, Bank Sponsored Investment Management Services: Consideration
of the Regulatory Problems, and Suggested Legislative and Statutory Interpretive Responses, 1977
DUKE L.J. 983.
108. The impact is to even out fluctuations that might otherwise occur in the integrated
company's stream of income. In the last two years or so - with interest rates low and the stock
market strong - banks with brokerage affiliates have fared better than those without. See
Schmitt, supra note 31; see also Litan, supra note 31, at 11.
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The courts have endorsed this expansion without serious question.
In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Govemors 109 (the Schwab
decision), the Supreme Court held that a holding company was free to
enter this line of business because section 20, read strictly, reaches
only those entities principally engaged in activities traditionally associated with the distribution of securities. Given the explicit language in
section 16 permitting nonrecourse transactions solely upon customer
order, this holding was predictable. Since a discount broker is not cast
in the role of "selling" a particular security, neither conflict of interest
nor temptation to use bank funds to support the issuer or the market
for its securities is likely to be present. 110 Still, the fading of Camp's
rhetorical influence is evident; the Court did not even pause to consider whether a combination banker/broker could really be expected
to be a source of "disinterested financial advice," given the incentive to
generate commissions through aggressive trading in stocks generally,
whether the banker gave advice as to specific securities or not.m
Can banks combine brokerage services with investment advice,
thereby coming into direct competition with full-service brokerage
firms in the securities industry? Here, there have as yet been no judicial decisions, and there is some disagreement between the two principal federal bank regulators. 112 From the standpoint of the historical
109. 468 U.S. 207 (1984). Banks themselves are permitted to offer discount brokerage activities as well. See Securities Indus. Assn. v. Comptroller, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983), affd. on
branching issue, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), revd. on branching issue, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
110. See 468 U.S. at 220-21; see also Note, A Banker's Adventures in Broker/and: Looking
Through Glass-Steagall at Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1498 (1983).
111. Following Camp closely, there is also the question of whether a bank might be tempted
to encourage customers to borrow heavily to make securities purchases. See note 114 infra. An
interesting issue that has arisen recently is the extent to which a discount broker can engage in
cooperative efforts with securities firms in the sales and distribution process. The Charles
Schwab firm proposed to sell its customer lists to certain investment companies, who would
contact Schwab customers about the availability of securities and indicate that Schwab was available to execute purchase transactions in such securities. The Federal Reserve Board's General
Counsel took the position that this would not violate Glass-Steagall. See 47 Wash. Fin. Rep.
(BNA) 483, 522 (Sept. 29, 1986) (correspondence between Federal Reserve general counsel
Michael Bradfield and Margery Waxman). A suit brought against the Federal Reserve Board in
federal district court was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Court Dismisses SIA 's Suit
Against Schwab, Fed, for Lack of Jurisdiction, 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) 721 (Nov. 3, 1986).
112. The Comptroller has taken the more liberal approach, allowing banks effectively to
combine the two functions (albeit in an awkward institutional arrangement). See Note, National
Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller's New Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69
VA. L. REV. 1303 (1983); American Natl. Bank of Austin, Tex., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,732 (Sept. 2, 1983). The Federal Reserve Board had been
more restrained, and its regulations on bank holding company nonbank activities preclude the
combination. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(15) (1986). Recently, however, it has taken a less restrictive position in the context of services for institutional investors, concluding that solely as a
matter of Glass-Steagall the two functions can properly be combined. See BHC Securities Brokerage Serv., [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,610 (June 13, 1986).
In July 1987, this ruling was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit. See Securities Indus. Assn. v. Board of
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intent of Glass-Steagall (more properly, of the 1935 amendment which
is the source of the authority for whatever stock brokerage services are
permissible113), combining banking services with full-scale brokerage
activities might seem troublesome. Even though direct concerns relating to bank soundness might be minimal, a public endorsement of a
particular investment might carry with it the temptation to use affiliated bank funds in a less than prudent fashion - a concern expressly
noted in Camp. Moreover, an aggressive combination of brokerage
and banking leading to a rediversion of energy and resources away
from the traditional deposit/commercial loan focus recalls the experience of the 1920s when so much of banking seemed to Carter Glass
and his colleagues little more than an adjunct of the investment
business. 114
On the other hand, the transitional jurisprudence of Glass-Steagall
points toward expansion. The channeling function has, as a matter of
law, been forgotten, and any judicial reasoning that thwarts a competitive response by the banking industry would only cause control over
some funds that otherwise would be directed to the banking industry
to shift to the securities industry, 115 frustrating that historic (but unattainable now) goal underlying the legislation. Strict statutory interpretation suggests that sections 16 and 21 are satisfied so long as the
customer makes the investment decision, with or without advice.
What minimal soundness concerns there are can readily be dealt with
by rulemaking. 116 All these factors combine to present a compelling
Governors, No. 86-1412, Slip. op. (D.C. Cir. July 7, 1987). See also Yang, Bank Firms Win
Round in Case Over Securities, Wall St. J., July 8, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
113. As originally drafted, the nonrecourse customer-directed transaction exception of section 16 was limited to purchases of investment-grade securities. The 1935 amendment, adopted
at the recommendation of the Comptroller's office, was designed to expand the accessibility of
brokerage services in communities that had no broker-dealers. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS·
URY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CuRRENCY 11 (1934).
114. One aspect of the problem that was of substantial concern to the drafters was the diversion of funds to support securities borrowing. The existence of retail brokerage affiliates creates
an incentive to channel loans for this purpose. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 632. Of course, the passage of section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 886 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982)), which gives the Federal Reserve Board complete
regulatory authority over margin lending - a channeling provision itself, see H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934) - reduces this concern substantially.
115. This raises the question whether consumers really want "one-stop" financial service
firms - in which case they will switch to those firms with broad product offerings - or whether
they are perfectly content to "unbundle" their services, finding different providers for each need
and taking advantage of technology innovations to shift funds back and forth. In the latter case
banks would not lose substantial funds simply because they did not have the full range of services. For a skeptical view of the desirability of the "financial supermarket," see Bennett, Consumer Demand/or Product Deregulation, ECON. REV., May 1984, at 28.
116. There is at present disagreement among the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the banking regulators as to who should be the primary regulator for brokerage affiliates. The
SEC adopted a rule requiring registration with it of such affiliates, notwithstanding the definition
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case for a court disinclined to deny banks a usefully diversified source
of earnings to support profitability in an environment where there is
far more risk attendant to the traditional banking functions than was
imagined in the post-1933 marketplace.
2. Individual Retirement Accounts

One of the most notable economic developments of the recent decades in the United States has been the growth in tax benefit-induced
retirement savings, 117 particularly in the form of the individual retirement account (IRA). Until the recent tax reform legislation the IRA
permitted certain individuals a credit of up to $2000 for annual contributions; it still allows deferral of taxation on the income generated in
such accounts. As part of normal banking business, commercial banks
offer IRAs in the form of certificates of deposit and money market
accounts. However, a number of banks have sought in addition to
offer IRA accounts to persons wishing higher returns on their investments via collective investment funds, for which the bank acts as
trustee. These collective funds invest in a wide variety of securities,
including common stocks, and in this sense are functionally identical
to mutual funds offered by the securities industry - also major competitors for IRA dollars.
Because of the extreme similarity between these collective trust
funds and the commingled managed agency accounts declared unlawful in Camp, the securities industry has charged that bank marketing
of these accounts violates Glass-Steagall. In the first reported decision
to address the issue, a federal district court in the Northern District of
California agreed. 118 Subsequently, that decision was reversed, 119 and
the courts of appeals for both the Second120 and District of Columbia
Circuits have upheld the Comptroller's authorization to national
banks to go forward with these plans.
of broker in section 3(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which appears to exclude banks from
broker status. See SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 22205, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 83,800 (July l, 1985). This rule was struck down by the District of Columbia
Circuit, in an opinion that is interesting for its exploration of the relationship between GlassSteagall and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. American Bankers Assn. v. SEC, 804 F.2d
739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
117. For a consideration of this development in a broad perspective, see Clark, The Four
Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561
(1981).
118. Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1984), revd. on other
grounds, 793 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 422 (1986).
119. Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 793 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 422
(1986).
120. Investment Co. Inst. v_ Clarke, 630 F. Supp. 593 (D. Conn.), ajfd. without opinion, 789
F.2d 175 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 422 (1986).
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The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in May 1986, Investment Co. Institute v. Conover, 121 is the archetypal transitional banking
law decision. The court acknowledged the similarity between the Citibank proposal at issue in Camp and the same bank's collective IRA
trust now under challenge, and noted that the proposed trust was
competitive with mutual fund products. However, it concluded that
technical differences made the proposed product more like the traditional collective trust arrangements long used in the banking industry,
which concededly did not violate the Act. While not denying that
Camp's "subtle hazards" could exist under the proposal as well, the
court simply - and accurately - noted that most of the same concerns could also be raised with respect to the traditional collective
trust. The court therefore determined that IRA participations were
not securities for purposes of Glass-Steagall.
The court did not address at any length the difference between the
traditional collective trust and the IRA program that the securities
industry emphasized in the litigation - the nature of the promotional
effort by the banks in support of the product. The traditional collective
trust was a vehicle for taking advantage of economies of scale for the
benefit of the multitude of individual trusts for which the bank operates as trustee. Historically, that sort of trust activity has not been a
particularly profitable activity for banks; rather, it has been an accommodation service to retain the good will of wealthier bank customers.
By contrast, IRA products - like the investment fund in Camp - are
designed and marketed as major income-producing vehicles for the
banks, to capture funds that might otherwise be directed to the securities industry. 122
While the court did not say so (and indeed hid from deeper inquiry
by invoking the rule of deference to administrative expertise), its decision is little more than a repudiation of Camp. In a transitional marketplace, any extension of the Camp reasoning to products such as
IRAs is counterproductive. The promotional and sales efforts necessary to attract retirement savings dollars away from competing broker-dealers, mutual funds, and insurance companies (not to mention
121. 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986).
122. See Note, Units of Participation in IRA Common Trust Funds Offered by Commercial
Banks: A Violation of the Glass-Steagall Act?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 745, 760 (1985); Note,

Glass-Steagall and Collective Investment Trusts for Individual Retirement Accounts: Fiduciary
Purpose or Investment?. 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961 (1985). One significant difference between
the typical trust fund and the IRA account, from a consumer perspective, is that the consumer is
investing for his own benefit (albeit with principal and gains deferred until retirement), whereas
the trust has generally been used for transferring wealth. The trust aspect of the account is by
legal requirement, not consumer preference. The incentive to speculate is arguably greater when
the account is a personal one.
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other banks) are inconsistent with the image of the concerned banker,
unaffected by a "salesman's interest," to whom members of the public
could tum for prudent and sound financial advice. But those promotional and sales efforts are no different from what banks engage in on a
daily basis as they compete in the financial services marketplace for
desirable depositors and borrowers. This is indeed a competitiveness
the public has come to accept. As noted in the previous section, the
fiduciary rhetoric loses whatever persuasive force it might once have
had under circumstances where monopoly rents have largely disappeared. The Conover court's failure to invoke it, notwithstanding its
centrality in Camp fifteen years earlier, is easy to appreciate.
3.

Ownership of Banks by Securities Firms

The legal decision most apparently at odds with the historic intent
of the drafters of the Glass-Steagall Act is not judicial but administrative: the determination by the Comptroller in cases involving J.W.
Seligman & Co. and Dreyfus & Co. to allow full-service securities
firms to acquire control of national banks. 123 Normally, issues relating
to control of banking institutions are decided by the Federal Reserve
Board under the Bank Holding Company Act. The banks in question,
however, were structured so that they were in the business of accepting demand deposits, but not of making commercial loans. Because the Board's authority under the Act extends only to companies
which control banks that perform both functions, it lacked jurisdiction
over this acquisition; 124 hence, the matter was one for the Comptroller
as the chartering authority for the banks. The objective of the securities firms - e.g., Dreyfus as one of the country's largest sponsors of
mutual funds - was to give their customers the option of placing a
portion of their funds in an FDIC-insured checking account, 125 and
123. Seligman, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 99,463 (Feb. 2,
1983); Dreyfus, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 99,464 (Feb. 7,
1983). See Pitt & Williams, The Glass-Steagall Act: Key Issues for the Financial Services Industry, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 234, 248-54 (1983).
124. At the time, the Board protested the Comptroller's action, contending that it did have
jurisdiction based on a revised reading of the definition of deposits and commercial loans. Subsequently, the Comptroller's view of the Holding Company Act issue was, for all practical purposes, accepted by the Supreme Court. See Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S.
Ct. 681 (1986). For a general discussion, see Note, Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts: An Option for Bank Product Expansion, 59 IND. L.J. 89 (1983).
125. The one important competitive advantage that had been retained by commercial banks
vis-a-vis the cash management· accounts of securities firms is deposit insurance. This expansion
by the securities firms was designed to eliminate that disadvantage. Merrill Lynch's acquisition
of a nonbank bank was structured so that the bank would make commercial loans but not accept
demand deposits. See Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
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therefore the possibility of shifting funds at will among the full range
of banking and investment accounts.
Before turning to the reasoning used by the Comptroller, it is
worth stepping back and considering the approval in terms of the
traditional understanding of Glass-Steagall. The bank is a separate
legal entity; hence, depositor funds are not directly at risk as a result of
the parent firm's securities activities. Beyond that, however, many of
the concerns articulated in Camp are clearly present. The bank is a
captive of the securities firm, with little reason for existing other than
to aid the sales and marketing effort of the investment firm complex hardly disinterested in the securities choices of its customers. In addition, the notion in Camp that there is a danger in public association of
a banking institution with the success or failure of an investment entity
applies here a fortiori. The only dangers that are lacking are those
related to potential misuse or skewing of the banks' lending powers and that only because the banks are structured in such a way that they
have no commercial lending powers. Finally, were the channeling objective to be invoked, the acquisition clearly invites a shift in deposit
funds to an institution legally prevented from engaging in precisely
what the drafters were trying to encourage via Glass-Steagall - the
provision of commercial credit.
This legal conclusion is even slightly colorable only because of the
transitional literalism and normative neutrality of the Supreme
Court's ICI II decision, a demonstration of the influence of styles of
judicial decisionmaking beyond the context of the particular case. The
Comptroller employed this approach in a series of interpretive steps.
First, it recognized correctly that only section 20 applies, since the
bank is an entity separate from the parent securities firm. 126 Second, it
concluded that only a small percentage of the securities firms' income
is attributable to underwriting and distributing securities on behalf of
its sponsored funds; most of the income comes from advisory fees,
126. A possible "loophole" in Glass-Steagall is the fact that section 20's prohibition on affiliation extends only to banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system. Therefore, there is
no Glass-Steagall bar to affiliations between nonmember insured banks and securities firms. In
Investment Co. Inst. v. FDIC, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 93,063
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1987), amended, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~
93,197 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 1987), the court adopted a literalist approach in rejecting the securities
industry's attempt to overturn the FDIC's acceptance of this conclusion. It should be noted that
other banking law provisions might limit the manner in which a nonmember bank engages in
securities activities. The FDIC used its general rulemaking authority to promote the safety and
soundness of insured banks by placing limits on affiliations between banks and securities firms.
The recent "noncontrol" affiliation between Japan's Sumitomo Bank and the investment banking
firm of Goldman Sachs raised no section 20 issue because Sumitomo's American bank was n
nonmember bank. See BHC Investment in Sec. Brokerage Firm, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,735 (Nov. 19, 1986).
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which the Comptroller viewed as outside the scope of section 20.
Therefore, it determined that the firms were not "engaged principally"
- statutory language that is becoming the most important battleground for Glass-Steagall skirmishing127 - in section 20 activities. As
a result, the affiliation between the bank and Dreyfus or Seligman was
not unlawful. Finally, the Comptroller determined that the firms did
not "control" the funds they sponsored because a majority of the directors of those funds were not associated with the firm. Hence, no
affiliation existed between the bank and the funds themselves (which
presumably were engaged principally in section 20 activities).
The flaws in the reasoning are not difficult to spot. 128 The Comptroller's "single entity" theory, which led him to view the Dreyfus
component entities as an integrated whole in determining the fractional denominator, is inconsistent with his willingness to separate out
the distribution income as a distinct line of business for purposes of
constructing the numerator. More realistically, all of Dreyfus' income
comes from the integrated business of sponsoring mutual funds, which
inseparably involves underwriting and distribution. The suggestion
that Dreyfus does not "control" its funds is patently absurd; the adviser-sponsor has total day-to-day authority over the funds' activities,
assumed in return for a compensation package largely dependent on
net asset value of the fund. It has both the ability and the motive to
cause both the funds and the bank to operate coordinately. 129
127. In Seligman, the section 20 income figure was 1.2%, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep, (CCH) at 86,601; in Dreyfus, it was less than 0.5%, [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) at 86,611. In support of this reading, the Comptroller
relied on Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947), the first Supreme Court GlassSteagall case, which held that the management interlock portion of the Act, section 32, did bar a
particular affiliation between a bank and a securities firm. In this case of relatively small practical importance, the Court gave a narrow reading to the term "primarily engaged." In a subsequent Federal Reserve Board decision, the Board adopted a broader test for "principally
engaged," indicating that only if a firm's securities-related income was "insubstantial" (perhaps
below 5% of the entity's total) could the impact of section 20 be avoided. Otherwise, in the
Board's view, firms could avoid Glass-Steagall altogether by creating securities affiliates that had
sufficiently diversified lines of business that no single activity reached the level of a majority. In
addition, the affiliate would be restricted to a relatively small market share. Bankers Trust New
York Corp., [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,770 (Dec. 24, 1986);
see also Chase Manhattan Corp., [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~
86,912 (Fed. Res. Bd. Mar. 18, 1987); Citicorp, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,957 (Fed. Res. Bd. Apr. 30, 1987). In a lawsuit filed by the Securities Industry
Association, the Second Circuit stayed the Board's approval of the Citicorp proposal pending
appeal on the section 20 issue. See Second Circuit Stays Fed's Section 20 Decision, 48 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 928 (May 25, 1987). Obviously, this litigation presents an opportunity to adopt a
construction of section 20 that operates to destroy Glass-Steagall, at least in the holding-company context.
128. See Note, Ownership ofMember Banks by Mutual Fund Advisers Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 691 (1984).
129. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1985), the principal regulatory statute governing mutual funds, is constructed almost entirely on the need to
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Why, then, did the Comptroller approve the acquisitions? At first
glance, the action appears to belie the "capture theory" often used to
describe the Comptroller as a functionary of existing banking interests, 13 0 who could not have been pleased by securities firm entry in this
fashion. There are two possibilities, probably in combination providing an answer. One has to do with the dual system of banking. If the
Comptroller did not permit the acquisition of a national bank, the securities firms probably would simply have sought state-chartered nonmember banks - to which section 20 would not apply at all - to
accomplish the same purpose.13 1 This way the Comptroller at least
retains some regulatory control over the affiliation. Second, it is worth
noting that the same reasoning utilized by the Comptroller would in
theory also allow a commercial bank both to sponsor a set of mutual
funds and engage in a host of other securities related activity, evading
the Camp decision through the simple step of making the funds and
their adviser separate legal entities. 132 On the assumption, appropriate
in the transitional marketplace, that "even playing field" competition
between banks and securities firms with respect to financial service
products is desirable without artificial regulatory constraints, the
Comptroller apparently was inclined to eliminate at least one of those
barriers. 133
protect against the possibility of overreaching by the investment adviser given de facto day·to·
day control. See generally T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS (1978).
130. See Posner, Theories ofEconomic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 335, 341
(1975); Macey, Special Interest Groups, supra note 64, at 37-39.
131. Indeed, J.W. Seligman subsequently switched over to a state charter, apparently to
avoid further problems with the Federal Reserve Board. See Note, supra note 128, at 703 n.51.
Certain "nonbank bank" acquisitions by securities and other financial services firms have also
been of state-chartered banks. The Prudential-Bache Insurance Company is an example. It is
also possible for banks themselves to switch to state charters (and drop out of the Federal Re·
serve system) in order to free themselves to create securities subsidiaries. Indeed, in light of
recent actions by the state of New York liberalizing the securities powers of state-chartered
banks there, see Ruling of the New York State Superintendent of Banks, [1985-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,771 (Dec. 23, 1986), federal regulators are taking
seriously the threat of charter-switching by some large New York banks. Indeed, there is the
possibility of dropping bank charters entirely. See Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
132. Of course, such separation would have to be bona fide. A situation where, notwithstanding legal separation, the bank "sold" shares of the affiliated fund would raise the question of
whether it was in fact selling or underwriting within the meaning of section 16 or 21. An interesting variation on the concept of bank sponsorship of mutual funds has been introduced by
Chase Manhattan, which offers a "market index investment" account that pays the depositor a
rate of interest tied to the performance of the stock market. The Investment Company Institute
has brought suit, charging a Glass-Steagall violation. 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 768 (Apr. 27,
1987).
133. For a useful exploration of section 20 in light of the interpretive techniques utilized in
Dreyfus and other recent judicial and administrative pronouncements, see Bock, The Glass-Steagall Act and the Acquisition of Member Banks by Unregulated Bank Holding Companies, 100
BANKING L.J. 484 (1983).
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The Limits of Transitional Jurisprudence: Commercial-Paper
Underwriting

Any hypothesis that the evolution of Glass-Steagall has been a
conscious updating process must confront the single recent instance
where the transitional rhetoric failed (at least on a first effort) to erode
the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions. This is the question of bank underwriting of commercial paper. As noted earlier, the increased use of
commercial paper as a means of corporate financing has meant that
banks have lost many of their highest-quality borrowers, and must
tum to higher-risk loans to compensate in the core banking business.
To recapture at least a portion of the lost income, a few banks have
sought to act as commercial-paper "placement agents," assisting issuers in locating and selling the paper to institutional investors. In response to a petition bY. Bankers Trust Co., the Federal Reserve Board
authorized such activity, finding no Glass-Steagall violation on
grounds that the short-term notes do not constitute securities within
the meaning of the Act. Instead, commercial paper is the functional
equivalent of a bank loan - the core business of banking. The
Board's ruling was affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit. 134
The Supreme Court, in Securities Industry Association v. Board of
Governors 135 (referred to as Bankers Trust), reversed in an opinion that
leads one to question the theory so far espoused that the evolutionary
direction of Glass-Steagall interpretation is inevitably to accommodate
marketplace transition. Notwithstanding the opportunity to use legislative intent in a way that would narrow the scope of Glass-Steagall's
restriction, the Court defined security in the broadest possible fashion.
On close examination, it seems that three discrete factors combined to
influence the Court's decision. First, the Court, having assumed (perhaps mistakenly) that sections 16 and 21 attempt to draw the same
line of separation, was forced to observe that section 21 expressly uses
the term "note" in defining the scope of the prohibition on underwriting and distributing. Given the literalism of the post-IC! II jurisprudence, it was led to reject an interpretive approach that would ignore
that language; in this sense, a transitional interpretive technique was
turned against itself. Second, the Court saw a potential conflict of interest that made Camp difficult to distinguish. By contrast to the discount brokerage context, or even the investment fund at issue in
Camp, commercial-paper underwriting activity involves a formal
134. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), revg. 519 F.
Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1981).
135. 468 U.S. 137 (1984), revg. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
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(probably long-term) association between the issuer and the bank.
This association raises the question whether the bank could serve as an
impartial source of either advice or credit or whether instead it would
be tempted to favor those with whom it had this kind of investment
banking relationship and disfavor others. Third, the Board's ruling
was a bald assertion of the inapplicability of Glass-Steagall as a matter
of law, rather than an approach that sought in advance to control potential abuses through regulation. Faced with these three factors, the
Court engaged in a predictable rhetorical overreaction and reinvoked
many of the weaker conceptual anachronisms of Camp, even some of
the fiduciary ideology.
Under an interpretation of Glass-Steagall that emphasizes the
soundness and conflict-of-interest elements of legislative intent, the
Court's result is plausible136 - although it still leaves unresolved how
it is that banks can deal in or invest for their own account (as they
surely must be able to) in many common lending equivalents, given
the breadth of the Court's definition of security. 137 There is, however,
an important irony in the Court's decision. Were the Court to have
recognized that the principal objective of Glass-Steagall was to take
away the incentive to divert savings dollars from productive to speculative uses (and that the elimination of conflicts of interest and other
soundness threats was an ancillary motivation understandable only in
the context of this broader objective), it would have concluded that
bank underwriting of commercial paper was an entirely legitimate use
of bank energies and resources. An underwriter plays the role of reducing search and transaction costs in the movement of short-term
borrowed capital - precisely the basic function that a bank performs
when it acts as an intermediary generally. Though the "subtle
hazards" the Court considered are possible, they arise whenever a
bank enters into a long-term financing relationship with a borrower.
So long as the underwriting in question promotes the use of funds on
such a credit basis, the historical intent of the Act is furthered, not
compromised. But in the statutory evolution of Glass-Steagall, that
136. See Macey, Special Interest Groups, supra note 64, at 29-34; Note, supra note 104, at
118.
137. See Glidden, Bank Sales of Commercial Paper Under the Glass-Steagall Act: The
Hazards of the Bankers Trust Decisions, 42 Bus. LAW. 1, 17-19 (1986). Glidden observes in
addition that it was both unnecessary and unreasonable for the Court to base its analysis on the
assumption that sections 16 and 21 seek to draw an identical line of separation. He argues that
Congress intended section 16 to describe limitations on bank activities, and section 21 to deal
only with the banking activities of investment banks. This is important because section 16 does
not contain the word "note" in its reference to prohibited securities activities. For another criticism of Bankers Trust along these lines, see Note, Security Under the Glass-Steagall Act: Analyzing the Supreme Court's Framework for Determining Permissible Bank Activity, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 1194 (1985).
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original goal had completely disappeared from sight. In this, Camp's
myopia may have taken its heaviest toll.
Bankers Trust dealt only with the "security" question, not the issue of whether the bank's proposed conduct in acting as an agent for
issuers of commercial paper would in fact violate the Act. The second
phase of the proceeding thus began, with Bankers Trust revising its
proposal to eliminate certain practices (e.g., extending credit to issuers, buying up unsold securities) which the Court had noted as potential problems. The Federal Reserve Board then ruled that, the Court's
decision notwithstanding, what the bank proposed to do did not constitute prohibited selling, distributing, or underwriting within the
meaning of sections 16 or 21. Its decision was quickly overturned by a
federal district court, 138 which found disingenuous the Board's attempt to avoid the Supreme Court's teachings. In tum, the court of
appeals reversed that decision and reinstated the Board's decision. 139
The court of appeals' decision, plainly reaching for the particular
result, reverted to the style and reasoning of ICI IL It began with the
command of deference to agency expertise, and throughout the opinion indicated its willingness to follow the Board's reasoning so long as
there was any plausible basis for so doing. 140 The court determined
that, read literally, section 16's permissive phrase allowing a bank to
buy or sell securities "solely upon the order, and for the account of,
customers" described the proposed conduct, and was not limited (as
the legislative history suggested) to brokerage services. Then, eschewing literalism, the court delved into legislative history analysis to find
that "underwriting" occurs only in the context of a public offering of
securities, not the sort of private placements that Bankers Trust was
proposing. Finally, the court dismissed the district court's "subtle
hazards" analysis, finding that given the current nature of the commercial-paper market and the restrictions agreed to by Bankers Trust,
only one of the hazards identified by the Supreme Court might be
present in any significant sense (possible reputational harm if commercial-paper purchases recommended by the bank turned out to be poor
ones), and one such hazard was not enough. 141
What is most notable about the court's opinion - apart from its
138. Securities Indus. Assn. v. Board of Governors, 627 F. Supp. 695 (D.D.C. 1986).
139. Securities Indus. Assn. v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3849 (U.S. June 22, 1987) (No. 86-1429).
140. A key holding - the definition of underwriting - rested on nothing more than the
court's finding that "it seems highly plausible that one line Congress might have drawn" was that
offered by the Board, 807 F.2d at 1066 (emphasis added).
141. One of the most debatable of the court's assertions is that all of the subtle hazards must
be present in order to find a particular "borderline" activity violative of the Act.
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internal inconsistency in choosing its canons of construction - is the
mode of analysis that relegates the subtle hazards inquiry to the factspecific level, thus permitting it to avoid most of the Supreme Court's
concerns by determining that in view of Bankers Trust's promises and
the current status of the commercial-paper market, most of the abuses
would be unlikely to arise. That, as noted earlier, misses the point of
intent-based statutory interpretation in the context of a prophylactic
statute like Glass-Steagall. Words like "selling" or "underwriting" are
to be defined generically, with reference to the possible hazards feared
by Congress; the only remaining question is whether the proposed
conduct fits within those generic definitions, without reference to specific features of the market for a particular security or representations
of intent about avoiding particular conflicts of interest. Had the court
of appeals followed this approach (as did the district court), it would
have been difficult to avoid a contrary holding.142
Reasoning aside, the court's conclusion has at least the virtue of
marketplace realism. Once again, what Bankers Trust was proposing
did not in fact take it outside the business of banking in economic
terms. The bank simply plays a different intermediary role in the process by which capital moves in the form of commercial credit from net
savers to business enterprises in need of funds. To rule to the contrary
would pose a substantial roadblock not only to participation in the
commercial-paper market that has become an effective substitute for
bank lending, but also to participation in the variety of new securitized
financing vehicles that have become a large part of the marketplace in
short- and medium-term debt.1 43
E.

Conclusion

The Glass-Steagall Act evolved in distinct stages. The actual motivation of its drafters was admittedly an amalgam of concerns, but to
142. Most significantly, the restriction of the term "underwriting" to public distributions
would have been difficult as a generic matter in light of the Supreme Court's finding of significant
potential for abuse in the securities distribution process, even to sophisticated investors. See
Bankers Trust, 468 U.S. at 156, 159. It is also questionable whether the current state of the
commercial-paper market should be given controlling effect. With the market expanding so rap·
idly, what might be of minimal concern today could become far more significant.
143. With the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the second phase of the proceeding,
leaving standing the D.C. Circuit's accommodationist holding, even the commercial-paper litiga·
tion in the end falls into the transitional jurisprudence category. Still, there will be more litigation, especially in the context of securitization. See Security Pacific Gets OCC Go-Ahead to Sell
Mortgage-Backed Certificates, 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1120 (June 29, 1987) (litigation over sale
of collateralized obligations). Hopefully, the courts will recognize that where the bank itself
securitizes some of its own loan portfolio, there is no overriding reason why it should not be able
to shift the risk and return interest to individual investors; this is still the process of matching net
savers with net borrowers in the provision of commercial credit.
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those most responsible for its enactment it was as much as anything
the desire to redirect the resources and energies of the banking industry back to the historic role as provider of commercial credit, a need
sorely felt in the earliest years of the Depression. Nearly forty years
later, that intent was reformulated in the Supreme Court's anomalous
Camp decision. While seeking to carry out what it considered Congress' objective, the Court in fact narrowed the appropriate inquiry to
issues of bank soundness and fiduciary responsibility, and thereby diminished the strength of the apparent legislative justification. Still, the
approach was one of expansive purposive construction of the Act's
prohibitions. The third stage - concurrent with the onset of fundamental marketplace transition in the financial services industry took that already-narrowed focus and transformed it yet again, to a
rather sterile set of restrictions readily planned around, unencumbered
by the rhetoric of the public role of the banking industry that was so
engrained in the prior understanding.
Two points bear emphasis. One is that, through the process of
statutory interpretation, prevailing interpretive doctrine has moved
away, to a significant degree, from an emphasis on furthering the
drafters' ostensible objectives in choosing to separate commercial and
investment banking. The other is that - apart from an aberration
like Bankers Trust - the realities of the transitional marketplace have
been accepted, and the frustrating and potentially dysfunctional effects
that Glass-Steagall might otherwise have on the development of the
market for financial services have been minimized.
This transition in judicial construction has not been explicit or candid. To the contrary, two facially neutral interpretive techniques have
emerged in this process as updating vehicles for courts inclined to use
them. The first is narrow, literal, "bright-line" statutory interpretation, with an emphasis on the value of predictability. This canon is
invoked even though it seems clear that Glass-Steagall is drafted in an
inartful and inconsistent fashion, showing the press of time and other
legislative business.144
144. See Hawke, The Glass-Steagall Legacy: A Historical Perspective, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 255, 257-60 (1986). Literalism, generally thought of as a rule of construction more suited
to a criminal context than New Deal prophylactic regulation, naturally limits the restrictive
reach of the statute, and this is precisely the result desired in order to accommodate marketplace
change. Another important banking law decision of the Supreme Court, Board of Governors v.
Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986), is a vivid example of narrow construction producing a result that effectively accommodated marketplace change - there in the context of the
nonbank bank. See note 124 supra. In that case the Court struck down an attempt by the
Federal Reserve Board to expand its jurisdiction under the Bank Holding Company Act beyond
the literal confines of the word "bank," and thereby thwart the market-driven proliferation of
"nonbank banks" in the United States. While the Court's decision stresses the virtue of literalism, it would also appear that the result is a correct one in light of actual legislative intent. In
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The second is deference to administrative expertise. The nature of
the banking industry is such that the acquiescence of the primary regulator is generally necessary before an initiative is undertaken. As
noted earlier, the regulators have accommodated marketplace change.
Hence, Glass-Steagall litigation has generally been in the form of challenge to or review of a permissive administrative rule or decision.
Here, too, there has been a noticeable shift toward deference as a basis
for the judicial decision, without any truly principled articulation for
why deference is compelling in one case but not in another. 145 But
clearly, the consequence of deference has been to lessen the impact of
the Act.
Exactly how conscious the judicial shift from the traditional to the
transitional has been is a matter for speculation. Bankers Trust shows
that, for some judges, whatever transitional impulse exists is not an
overriding one, and that old ideas and rhetoric may be reaffirmed if
there is no way to abandon them gracefully. As to the cases that are
plainly transitional in result, a variety of factors unrelated to a desire
to update can contribute to gradual doctrinal change. Judges' personal and professional contacts with banking and financial services
create assumptions and dissonances, reflecting the current marketplace, that can skew even a careful attempt to determine legislative
purpose. Dicta in one case, perhaps not well thought through by a
judge (or law clerk) because of its tangentiality, can subsequently form
Dimension, the Court observed that literalism can also be a useful vehicle for assuring that the
"hard fought compromises" of the legislative process are not undercut in the name of effectuating
the legislative victors' particular "purpose." 106 S. Ct. at 689. The intellectual history of the
shift in interpretive styles under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws from broad
interpretation, see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), to literalism, see, e.g.,
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980), reflects an increasing awareness of the
severe liability consequences, civil and criminal, of a securities law violation. That same concern
is not nearly as pressing in a context like Glass-Steagall, where the likely consequence of a ruling
against an industry participant is simply ceasing to offer a service, or, at most, to divest a newly
acquired subsidiary.
145. The Supreme Court's leading case on deference, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is relied upon heavily in the transitional decisions. That
case has itself been described as simply the "latest in a long series of erratic Supreme Court
decisions reviewing agency actions." Note, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV.
87, 255 (1984). There are a few principles that underlie the law of deference: long-standing
interpretations, for example, are entitled to more deference than new administrative constructs or
reversals of position. But by and large a safe generalization seems to be that the rhetoric of
deference is invoked after the court concludes that the administrative decision is a sound one. In
that sense, it adds little or nothing to the analysis. In evaluating the Court's approach on deference, it is worth comparing the two Glass-Steagall decisions of 1984, decided on the same day,
which contain contrasting language on deference. Compare Schwab, 468 U.S. at 217 with Bankers
Trust, 468 U.S. at 143-44. See also Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681,
686 (1986).
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the basis for a holding in another. What is really a doctrinal departure
is then cloaked by an illusion of consistency.
In the end, however, it is difficult to believe that the more sophisticated courts - perhaps the Supreme Court in !CI IL certainly the
courts of appeals in the IRA cases - have not appreciated the extent
to which their decisions have departed from both the logic and the
rhetoric of the Camp decision (which purported to reflect congressional intent), if not from the actual legislative intent itself. The tum
that the law has taken in both rhetoric and result is far too visible to
any careful observer. Accordingly, there is at least tentative reason to
hypothesize that much of the judicial updating of the Glass-Steagall
Act has indeed been intentional.
III.

INTERPRETING THE McFADDEN

ACT

A second statutory provision that has become obsolete in the transitional banking marketplace is the restriction on branching by national banks and members of the Federal Reserve System, imposed by
the McFadden Act of 1927. 146 The Act, as amended in the Banking
Act of 1933, provides that those banks may establish branches within
their state only to the extent that state-chartered banks are authorized
to do so. "Branch" is defined in an open-ended fashion to "include
any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or
any branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received, or
checks paid, or money lent."147
The transitional marketplace is characterized, as noted earlier, by
declining geographic barriers to entry in certain market segments. 148
Technology has provided means for attracting deposits from and making loans to individuals and businesses geographically far removed
from the bank's physical location. Both the desire to expand and the
increased level of risk inherent in the traditional banking business have
pressured banks to take advantage of these opportunities and to seek
to diversify geographically both the sources and uses of their funds.
This Part will focus on the case law interpreting the branching restriction as applied to so-called electronic branching by banking institutions. It will be shorter than the preceding one, for there are fewer
146. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1985). The restrictions on branching are extended to member banks in
12 U.S.C. § 321 (1985). One interesting aspect of the 1927 Act is that it also confirmed (and
perhaps validated previously unlawful) securities powers of national banks - powers that were
taken away six years later in the Glass-Steagall Act. See Prefatory Note, Glass-Steagall Act -A
History ofIts Legislative Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING L.J. 38, 39-40 (1975).
147. 12 u.s.c. § 36(f) (1985).
148. See Part I.A. supra.
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cases to consider. Nonetheless, the intellectual progression reflected in
a series of three cases on this issue from 1969 to 1985 is clear, replicating to a remarkable degree the evolution of Glass-Steagall. Once
again, in the latest of these cases, transitional jurisprudence is readily
observable. 149
A.

The McFadden Act's Intent

The legislative history of the McFadden Act reflects the interplay
of economics and politics in a way even more pronounced than the
usual banking legislation. 150 A natural political goal, if economic
growth through credit extension is to be achieved, is making banking
services readily available in all communities of the country. One way
this can occur, of course, is by allowing a bank chartered in one location to expand freely into others by branching. This has noticeable
economic advantages. It permits the most efficient banks to grow and
make their services available to a larger segment of the population. At
the same time it allows diversification of both assets and liabilities in a
way that avoids excessive concentration at the home location, reducing the risk to the bank that would otherwise follow from a severe
downturn in the local economy.1s1
Throughout much of its history, however, American banking policy has gone in the opposite direction. In the earliest years of the National Banking Act it was assumed that national banks could not
branch at all. In response to the pressure to make banking services
more accessible in smaller communities, Congress and the federal regulatory authorities (as well as the states) pursued policies of granting
new charters freely, often without sufficient regard to the capital or
qualifications of the promoters, rather than permitting expansion by
149. The discussion that follows builds from that presented in Langevoort, Interpreting the
McFadden Act: Tlze Politics and Economics ofShared ATM's and Discount Brokerage Houses, 41
Bus. LAW. 1265 (1986).
ISO. For discussions of the evolution in branching policy, see E. WHITE, THE REGULATION
AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM, 1900.1929 (1983); H. BURNS, supra note
81; G. FISCHER, AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE (1968); Glidden, Legal Constraints on Bank
Expansion: Can They Be Removed Without Destroying the Dual Banking System?, 1980 U. ILL.
L.F. 369; Fischer & Golembe, Tlze Branch Banking Provisions of the McFadden Act as Amended:
Their Rationale and Rationality, in SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INST. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., COMPENDIUM OF ISSUES
RELATING TO BRANCHING BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1.
151. One of the major sources of current difficulties of banking institutions in the Southwest
and the Farm Belt has been excessive reliance on localized lending opportunities by energy and
agriculture, respectively. See, e.g., Texas Banks: Deep in the Heart of Trouble, ECONOMIST, Feb.
22, 1986, at 73. It has been suggested that Canada's banking system was subject to fewer bank
failures during the Depression because its pro-branching regulatory policy promoted greater di·
versification. See White, A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of1933, 44 J. EcoN. HIST. 119
(1984).

February 1987]

fltatutory <Jbsolescence

721

existing banks. 152
This policy had two predictable effects. First, the growth of "unit"
(i.e., nonbranch) banking increased the frequency of bank failures,
with the attendant adverse consequences on local communities in an
era prior to deposit insurance. Second, those many unit banks that
were able to survive (if not prosper to a point where they wished to
expand) formed an extremely powerful political lobby dedicated to
preserving and protecting their local markets from entry by outsiders.
Initiatives at the federal level to address the first of these developments
by permitting national bank branching were defeated by virtue of the
second.
At the state level the political results were somewhat more varied,
and in the early portion of this century some jurisdictions began to
allow their state-chartered banks to branch, occasionally state-wide,
but more commonly on a smaller (e.g., county-wide) basis. 153 Into the
1920s, fear was expressed at the federal level that there might be a loss
of regulatory authority to the extent that larger banks switched their
charters from federal to state to take advantage of liberalized branching authority. This was particularly of concern with respect to the
Federal Reserve System, the newly created vehicle for banking and
commercial stability that depended on a sizable national bank
membership.1 54
At this point, a major battle was joined. The unit banking lobby
was anxious to prevent branching as far as possible. 155 Reformers
(with substantial support among the federal regulators) pushed for relatively liberal branching powers as a way of addressing the recurring
problem of excessive deconcentration in the banking industry, and its
resulting fragility. In the middle was the concern about the continuing
viability of the Federal Reserve.
The McFadden Act of 1927 was essentially a victory for the unit
bankers: Congressman McFadden himself described the bill as an
152. See E. WHITE, supra note 150, at 22-23.
153. Id. at 156-60.
154. The problem was made more pressing by a ruling of the Supreme Court in 1924, First
Natl. Bank v. Missouri ex rel Barrett, 263 U.S. 640 (1924), which strongly suggested that national banks indeed lacked the authority to branch. Some branch banking by national banks was
statutorily permitted if the national charter was obtained via conversion from a state charter, and
the state bank already had branches. See R. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SuPERVISION 101-02 (1968).
155. Illustrative of this was the so-called Hull Amendment of 1924, legislation -supported
at the time by the American Bankers Association - that would have prevented any branching in
a state that at the time of the legislation did not authorize state bank branching, even if the state
later revised its position. See E. WHITE, supra note 150, at 163-64.
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"anti-branch banking measure . . . ." 156 A formal restriction on
branching not only for national banks but also for state chartered
members of the Federal Reserve was written into federal law. The one
element of compromise allowed national and member banks to branch
in their own towns and cities if such authority was granted to statechartered banks. That element of the legislation was designed to foster
some limited "competitive equality" between national and state banks
so as to protect the Federal Reserve System. 15 7
This was not much reform, and the next five years witnessed the
adverse economic effects of deconcentration as the United States entered the Depression. The incidence of bank failures, usually of smalltown unit banks, increased substantially. At this point, the legislative
histories of the McFadden Act and the Glass-Steagall Act join, for
Carter Glass took the lead in pressing for further branching authority
for national and member banks in the same draft legislative package in
1931 that first proposed the divorce of commercial and investment
banking. 158 Though Glass said that he came to support branch banking "reluctantly," 159 his actions are consistent with the two strong
concerns that motivated him generally - promotion of the availability
of credit to farmers and businessmen, and protection of the Federal
Reserve System.1 60
The unit bankers opposed liberalization. They were championed
by Senator Huey Long of Louisiana (who threatened a filibuster over
the issue), as well as by some large city banks (including at one point
the Chase National Bank) that wanted to protect their profitable correspondent banking relationships with the unit bankers. 161 Glass' influence, however, was enough to place in the final version of the
Banking Act of 1933 a provision permitting national and state member
banks to branch anywhere within the state where they were located if
state law permitted state-chartered banks to branch. 162 This standard
- fairly complete competitive equality - was less than Glass wanted
but all that was politically feasible, even in 1933. And even that much
liberalization was probably obtained only as a compromise to gain
what the unit bankers'_ representatives wanted most - federal deposit
156. 68 CoNG. REc. 2166 (1927).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
(1982)).

This was not an end in itself. See Fischer & Golembe, supra note 150, at 21.
See H. WILLIS & J. CHAPMAN, supra note 71, at 80-82.
S. KENNEDY, supra note 68, at 207.
See Part II.A.I. supra.
See H. BURNS, supra note 88, at 58-59.
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36
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insurance. 163
What does this say about the congressional intent underlying the
McFadden Act? On balance, the unit bankers had won the political
victory, shifting the arena for debate over branching from Congress to
the state legislatures - where they also had substantial power. The
only condition was that national banks not be disadvantaged competitively if a state chose to permit branching. In this sense, the Act represented the judgment of Congress that in general it was appropriate as a
matter of regulatory policy to limit geographic expansion. The reasons for this determination vary; no doubt special-interest pressure for
home market protection was a (probably the) dominant factor. But
the legislative history expresses facially legitimate - though not necessarily persuasive - "public-regarding" concerns as well, and it is
likely that these in fact played an honest role in the formulation of the
law. Foremost among them was the channeling objective: promoting
local reinvestment of deposits by preserving local control over banking
institutions, thus avoiding the drain of funds from remote regions to
the money centers that was feared if authority over use of the funds
was placed in a distant bank headquarters. 164 Closely related was the
desire to avoid concentrating too much economic power in moneycenter banking institutions, quite apart from where the money was
used. 165 Closing local markets to expansion by growth-oriented banks
would indirectly accomplish this. Statutory interpretation of the McFadden Act that seeks to adhere to the legislative intent could legitimately use these considerations as touchstones of legislative
purpose.166

B. Judicial Reformulation
The first Supreme Court decision to construe the McFadden Act's
definition of branch, First National Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 167
is strikingly similar to the Camp decision under Glass-Steagall in at
least four respects. Both involve interpretive issues of first impression
163. See Golembe, supra note 80, at 198-99 (citing 77 CoNG. REc. 5897 (1933) (remarks of
Rep. Goldsborough)).
164. See Part I.B.3. supra. McFadden referred to this as absentee control over community
money, an "unsound and un-American" practice. 65 CONG. REc. 11,297 (1924).
165. See Part I.B.2. supra.
166. See Langevoort, supra note 149, at 1268-69; Comment, Customer-Bank Communication
Terminals and the McFadden Act Definition of a "Branch Bank," 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 362, 38486 (1975). This is not to say, once again, that these are persuasive arguments - simply that they
were honestly held by at least some of the drafters. For a discussion of some of the costs and
benefits of geographic expansion and its regulation, see King, Interstate Banking: Issues and
Evidence, EcoN. REv., Apr. 1984, at 36.
167. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
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nearly forty years after statutory enactment, on the eve of marketplace
transition. Both overturn a decision of the Comptroller of the Currency, giving little deference to administrative expertise. Both purport
to give broad, purposive readings to the restrictive statutes in question.
And both formulate interpretive approaches that, while well-intentioned, miss the point of actual legislative intent, thereby creating the
potential to skew subsequent case law.
Plant City involved a challenge to a decision of the Comptroller,
who had held that the McFadden Act did not bar a national bank
from establishing a receptacle in a shopping center that bank customers could use to make deposits, or an armored car that would travel to
various customers to take their deposits. If such facilities were considered branches, they would have been impermissible under Florida law.
The Comptroller held that they were not branches, on the ground that
as a technical matter the deposits were not legally effective until delivered back to the bank by bank personnel.
In overturning the Comptroller's decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and found that the dominant
congressional intent was to establish "competitive equality'' between
state and national banks. 168 Therefore, the proper test for whether a
facility is a branch is ~hether its existence could give the establishing
bank an advantage in competition for customers or funds over statechartered banks that might not be able to expand their reach in the
same fashion. Under that test, both the receptacle and the armored
car were branches.
The Court's analysis assumes, wrongly, that the drafters saw competitive equality as an important end in itself, a way of promoting federalism and the dual system of banking. Instead, the rule of equality
was merely an element of compromise in legislation designed primarily to express a congressional preference for protecting local banking
markets from entry by larger, more economically powerful banks. 169
The more precise test, then, would have been whether the existence of
168. 396 U.S. at 133. The Court derived its competitive equality principle from First Natl.
Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966), which dealt with the extent to which a
bank may branch under the Act. There, competitive equality was clearly the proper test.
169. See Fischer & Golembe, supra note 150, at 21; Glidden, supra note 150, at 379-80. For
a discussion of the error in considering competitive equality a separate goal in banking regulation
generally, see Scott, supra note 5, at 41-42. The harm in the Court's approach is evidenced in
subsequent lower court cases that have held such facilities to be branches, St. Louis County Natl.
Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co., 548 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977),
even though these do not really have the potential to cause a serious outflow of local deposits. In
the Supreme Court's most recent McFadden Act decision, Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 107
S. Ct. 750 (1987), discussed in note 187 infra, the principle of competitive equality was limited to
equality in core banking functions, effectively precluding this result.
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the facility could reduce local control over local funds, threatening the
possibility of funds flowing out of the locality to remote locations
notwithstanding a state-enunciated policy to the contrary. As with
Camp, however, this is a quibbling criticism in the context of the facts
before the Court. Either approach leads to a determination that the
facilities in question were branches.
Naturally, the Plant City decision established the framework for
deciding the more significant branching issues that soon followed. Far
and away the most important of these was the status of automated
teller machines (ATMs), the banking industry's effort to reduce costs
and increase convenience in everyday transactions with depositors. 170
Once again, the Comptroller was permissive, ruling that ATMs were
not branches, and thus could be established at remote locations by
national banks without regard to state branching laws.
Given the substance-over-form approach set forth in Plant City,
the Comptroller's ruling was certainly open to question. Predictably,
it was rejected in a number of cases, most notably by the District of
Columbia Circuit in Independent Bankers Association of America v.
Smith. 171 The court found that an ATM realistically is a place where
deposits are made, checks paid, and money lent; 172 hence, it is a
branch. The opinion is a belabored one, perhaps reflecting the court's
discomfort with the result as a policy matter, given the clear consumer
benefits of this feature of the transition toward electronic banking.
But it found no alternative given the Supreme Court's competitive
equality test, and left to Congress or the states the task of policy
modification. 17 3
C.

Transitional Jurisprudence: Shared ATMs

Smith did not thwart marketplace evolution toward wide-scale
electronic branching. The response, growing out of efforts to provide
small community banks with ATM facilities when they could not afford the large start-up costs to establish their own, was to restructure
170. For an excellent analysis, see Comment, supra note 166.
171. 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); see also State Bank v.
Merchants Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1979); Colorado ex rel. State Banking
Bd. v. First Natl. Bank, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977).
172. That a deposit can be made at an ATM is clear; the other statutorily enumerated functions are somewhat less obvious. According to the court, the substance-over-form approach
compelled a finding that a check is paid when money is withdrawn from the machines, 534 F.2d
at 942-45, and that money is lent when a withdrawal results in an overdraft, 534 F.2d at 945-48.
173. A large number of states did revise their laws to permit ATMs to be used more widely
than traditional brick and mortar branches. See Recent Development, The Future of Shared
Automatic Teller Networks in the Wake of Marine Midland Bank: A Call for Federal Legislation,
38 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1626-29 (1985).
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the ownership interests in such devices via a pooling arrangement.
"Shared ATMs," as they came to be called, became accepted devices
whereby an independent firm (or perhaps a joint venture among a
group of banks) would establish and own a network of ATMs in a
given location, inviting local banks to participate pursuant to contractual arrangement. The participating banks' depositors would be given
debit cards enabling them to access the system to make deposits and
receive cash. Transaction fees would be charged to the banks.
Through switching devices, customer use of the machines would be
identical to use of machines actually owned by the bank; accounts
would be debited or credited immediately. This type of arrangement
soon became a means by which banks of all sizes could join nationwide
ATM networks, giving their customers remote multistate access to deposit facilities and cash. 114
The Comptroller declared that these facilities were not branches,
first through informal rulings, later in formal regulation, on the
grounds that branches must be "owned or rented" by the bank in
question in order to be "established" by that bank. 175 After initially
being struck down by a district court, 176 the Second Circuit upheld the
Comptroller's position in Independent Bankers Association v. Marine
Midland Bank 177
While one decision (particularly of a court of appeals, even if followed by a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court) cannot by itself
signal a change in judicial thinking on a given statute, Marine Midland
bears such a close similarity in style and structure to the transitional
decisions under Glass-Steagall that such an inference is warranted.
The court's determination that the word "establish" in the McFadden
Act requires a property interest (ownership or leasehold) in the facility
in question is an extremely narrow construction of the term. The
court did not arrive at it purposively through analysis of the competitive impact of shared ATMs; had it done so, a contrary result would
have been ca~ed for, since from a consumer perspective the attractive174. See McMahon & Peck, Recent Federal Litigation Relating to Customer-Bank Communication Terminals ("CBCTs") and The McFadden Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 1657 (1977); Status of
ATM's Under State Branching Laws: Hearings on S. 2898 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
175. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.3l(b) (1984). This concept was derived from dicta in the Smith case,
534 F.2d at 951-52.
176. Independent Bankers Assn. v. Marine Midland Bank, 583 F. Supp. 1042 (W.D.N.Y.
1984). The case itself involved a challenge to the use by out-of-town banks of the ATM facility
owned and operated by a large upstate New York supermarket chain, Wegman's.
177. 757 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2926 (1986). See generally Hawke,
2nd Circuit Expands Powers ofNational Banks, Legal Times, Mar. 18, 1985, at 18, col. 2; Recent
Development, supra note 173.
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ness of the devices (or the chance that they will be utilized) has little to
do with whose property the machines are or whose logo appears on
them. Moreover, by reference to the actual intent of the Act, shared
ATMs have the potential to upset the competitive balance between
large expansion-oriented banks and local community-oriented ones,
and to cause a geographic reallocation of savings capital. That, indeed, was why the community bankers of New York were bringing the
suit.
Instead, though admitting that it was "arbitrary,"1 78 the court
chose the narrow construction largely because it said it could find no
other bright-line way - invoking a predictability value reminiscent of
Glass-Steagall's ICI II decision - to distinguish between shared
ATMs and other remote transaction devices, like banking by telephone, home computers, or merchant-owned point-of-sale facilities. 179
In its view, apparently, the logical extension of the Plant City competitive-impact test proved too much, and some sort of pruning was thus
necessary.
The court's point has a superficial appeal. The competitive-impact
test is flawed in that, logically, any out-of-office activity undertaken by
a bank to extend its presence could be declared a branch, since virtually everything a bank does in terms of product or marketing innovation is designed to gain a competitive advantage. 180 A credit card
imprint device used by a merchant causes, for all practical purposes, a
loan to be made to the cardholder; depositors can use home computer
banking to transfer money from one account to another (a deposit
function) and cause payments to third parties. Some limiting principle
is indeed appropriate. But there was an intuitively attractive alternative limiting principle open to the court that would have worked acceptably and not done any real violence to the purposive definitional
test of Plant City and Smith. This was an "agency" test, which asks
whether (as with shared ATM's) the device is operated, pursuant to
contractual obligation, primarily for the benefit of participating banks,
or whether instead (as with home computers and point-of-sale facilities) the device is really for the benefit of the merchant or consumer,
without any legal agency-like obligation to any bank. 18 1 The court's
178. 757 F.2d at 462.
179. 757 F.2d at 459-60. This same problem had bothered the Smith court, leading to the
"own or rent" dicta.
180. See Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1220 (1981).
181. See Langevoort, supra note 149, at 1275-76. With the shared ATM, the owner of the
devices is by contract obligated to act on the bank's behalf in assuring that the deposit and cashdispensing functions are performed. Indeed, the owner has no interest in the devices apart from
this representative role. By contrast, the other devices are owned and operated by persons with
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choice of the narrow rule rather than this one strongly indicates the
affirmative desire to restrict the contemporary impact of the McFadden Act.
Predictably, the other major justification given by the court for its
holding was deference to the Comptroller's administrative expertise. 182
The court's long discourse on deference notes the difficulties for industry members that would be caused by upsetting their reliance on the
agency's interpretation of the Act; it does not explain why deference is
more appropriate here than in the overturning holdings in Plant City
and Smith, the two controlling precedents. 18 3
As with the nature of its reasoning, the effect of the court's decision is plainly accommodationist. Permitting widespread use of
shared ATMs- not to mention other mechanisms for geographic expansion that need not be owned or rented by the bank 184 - increases
consumer convenience and options, and lowers the cost to the banks of
delivering financial services on a remote basis. It avoids placing national banks at a potential disadvantage vis-a-vis state banks not subject to McFadden with respect to interstate ATM utilization.1 85 As to
the historic objective underlying the Act, the transitional marketplace
is characterized by rapid low-cost movement of funds among geographic locations, thus frustrating any reasonable expectation that localism can be an achievable public policy. 186 Adhering to a broad
either no contractual obligation to the bank to act on its behalf or obligations that are incidental
to its own proprietary interest in facilitating consumer transactions.
182. 757 F.2d at 461-62.
183. This is especially the case in light of action by Congress in the Depository Institution
Deregulations and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 188 (1980), to
deprive the Comptroller of rulemaking authority under the McFadden Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 93a
(1985). The same restriction is imposed with respect to the Glass-Steagall Act.
184. On future technological impact, see Bergen, What's Really Happening in Bank Automa·
tion, BANKERS MONTHLY, Apr. 15, 1986, at 16. One problem unaddressed by the court is the
status of ATMs that are owned by an affiliate of the bank in a holding company structure. Prior
administrative law suggested that so long as the ATM was operated for the benefit of the bank, it
would be a branch. See Order Approving Acquisition of Bank, Michigan Natl. Corp., 64 FED.
RES. BULL. 127 (1978). Another expansion device might be the use of deposit brokers - brokerdealer firms that solicit their customers for deposits on behalf of participating banks - a practice
which has been challenged on branching grounds. See Iowa v. Shearson·American Express, No.
81-514A (S.D. Iowa filed Oct. 16, 1981). In general, sufficient development ofnonbranch expan·
sion techniques will place such stress on the prevailing regulatory structure of the banking system that substantial modification of the "dual system of banking" is inevitable. See note 45 supra
and accompanying text. The Marine Midland decision accelerates that development.
185. The court used this to justify its result. 757 F.2d at 460-61. However, the absolute
prohibition on interstate branching found in the McFadden Act is a conscious legislative choice,
which naturally can operate to the disadvantage of national banks. It is not a reason for disre·
garding the Act's overriding objective. This point was made in the Smith case, 534 F.2d at 949·
50.
186. See Part I.B.3. supra; see also Felsenfeld, Electronic Banking and Its Effects on Interstate
Branching Restrictions - An Analytic Approach, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1019 (1986).
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interpretation of the branching prohibition with respect to shared
ATMs would therefore have done little to further any of the legitimate
goals that Congress once had in mind for the banking system certainly not enough to outweigh the cost savings and the convenience
to the public. To the extent that the court understood the nature of
the marketplace transition in this regard, its holding is quite
circumspect. 187
IV.

CONCLUSION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND POLITICAL
VALUES

The McFadden Act experience reinforces the tentative conclusion
reached about the evolution of Glass-Steagall. The tendency of courts
interpreting these two statutes to depart from the expansive pursuit of
historic legislative goals, and instead to accommodate the new assumptions of the transitional banking marketplace, suggests as a
strong possibility the conscious judicial pruning of two apparently obsolete statutes.
At this point, it is necessary to consider an alternative explanation
for the shifts in direction taken by the courts under these two statutes.
The emphasis on "plain English" literalism may simply reflect the
adoption of this canon, a priori, as the neutral principle of interpretation best suited to the judiciary's institutional role in the enforcement
of statutes - quite apart from the outcomes it produces. This possibility cannot easily be dismissed; a number of current Justices of the
Supreme Court have emphasized the value of strict constructionism,
and it appears at first glance to have independent jurisprudential appeal.188 Two responses are in order. One is that the canon of literalism, divorced from contextual reference to actual intent, is
normatively hard to justify - indeed, internally inconsistent to the
187. See Note, ATM Networks Under the McFadden Act: Independent Bankers Association
of New York v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 35 AM. U. L. REv. 271 (1985). The Supreme
Court's most recent McFadden Act decision reflects to a considerable degree the transitional
style of judicial reasoning, although on close analysis it is probably also correctly decided in
terms of actual legislative intent as well. In Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 107 S. Ct. 750
(1987), the Court held that discount brokerage offices of national banks were not branches for
purposes of the McFadden Act. It deferred to the view of the Comptroller, supported by considerable legislative history, that the policy of competitive equality developed in prior decisions
should be promoted through the Act only with respect to "core" banking functions. The result is
accommodationist, of course, since it removes a potential barrier to product expansion in the
banking industry. On this issue generally, see Langevoort, supra note 149, at 1277-78; Note,
Interstate Banking Restrictions Under the McFadden Act, 72 VA. L. REv. 1119, 1134-37 (1986).
188. For an argument that the Supreme Court's change in interpretive technique in favor of
literalism masks a substantive preference for laissez-faire, see Note, Intent, Clear Statements and
the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 911-12
(1982). A distrust of governmental intrusion and a desire to update can merge in a way that
makes actual motivation difficult to discern.
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extent that its own justification is intent-based (i.e., that the drafters
would "want" strict interpretation). While it is no doubt true that in
many instances words in statutes are carefully chosen and ought be
given effect to the letter - and that carefully crafted language may
reflect the give and take of legislative compromise much more accurately than general statements of purpose 189 - it can just as easily be
the case that words or phrases are chosen in the press of legislative
business without the time or ability to consider carefully any choice of
locution. Any interpretation divorced from evidence of actual intent
has the potential, at least, to frustrate legislative purpose. 190 The second point is that courts do not adhere to a maxim of literalism with
enough consistency to grant it any sort of overriding legitimacy as a
neutral principle. Certainly the experience in the early stages of the
statutory life cycle indicates that purposive construction endures as a
maxim of equal persuasive power, illustrating the observation that for
every canon of construction there is an equal and opposite canon. 191
The popularity of literalism today may in fact simply reflect its usefulness as a pruning tool at a time when there are so many aging statutes.
Just as hard to justify from a neutral perspective, and applied with
even less consistency, is the other principal maxim used to effect the
doctrinal transition - deference to an agency's interpretation of a
statute committed to its administration. There is little reason to believe that an agency will give to a statutory provision a construction
that is a historically accurate reflection of legislative intent. In fact
there is substantial reason to believe that legislators choose explicit
statutory commands, rather than delegating to an agency rulemaking
authority over a particular issue, precisely to avoid subsequent administrative revision of a carefully worked out legislative outcome. 192
If the shift under the two statutes is not wholly by reference to
separately justifiable neutral principles of interpretation, then the updating hypothesis becomes more compelling. But the normative prob189. See Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
190. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 807-08. In the interpretation of
private contracts, the courts have long departed from the "plain English" approach as the dominant interpretative technique. While such an approach (just like the Statute of Frauds and the
"four corners" variation of the Paro! Evidence Rule) may operate as a useful cautionary device
forcing parties to be careful and explicit in promissory formulation, it has given way to the
primacy of actual intent, so as to protect the true expectations of the parties. See Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr.
561 (1968). The same point can readily be made with respect to statutory interpretation.
191. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 806 (citing K. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRAomoN 521-35 (1960)).
192. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 810-12; Macey, An Interest Group
Model supra note 64, at 263-64. On the question of consistency, see note 145 supra.
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lem then reappears. Have the courts any business engaging in such
efforts? The traditionalist answer, noted at the article's outset, is that
they do not. Posner has argued that the judicial function must be limited to determining and carrying out legislative intent, either actual or
reconstructed: a judge "should try to think his way as best he can into
the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have
wanted the statute applied to the case at bar" without any reference
whatsoever to contemporary values. 193 Any other approach to statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the fundamental separation of
powers, a countermajoritarian revision of the original "bargain" arrived at by the legislature. 194 In a similar vein, Judge Abner Mikva
argues that public assertion of an unrestrained "updating" power
could easily undermine the independence of the judiciary from the
political process. 195
To these concerns about the legitimacy of the updating hypothesis,
there is no answer other than Calabresi's. It asks much of judges to be
satisfied with the role of agent for legislators, long dead, whose expressed beliefs, assumptions, and policy predictions seem no longer capable of contributing much toward the public good. A more active
and creative role, one that accepts the responsibility for assessing
whether a statutory rule is "out of phase" with reality and for limiting
its scope unless it is reaffirmed by the legislature, seems far more satisfying. This role would be of equal dignity to the common-law powers
historically granted to the judiciary. 196
Is this necessarily countermajoritarian (or the frustration of legislative initiative based on the political preferences of some judges for
laissez-faire, as in the notion of economic due process in the thirties)?
Not if one looks at judicial behavior over the entire course of the statutory life cycle. According to the updating hypothesis, courts will give
expansive purpose-based scope to words or phrases so long as the prevailing conditions and assumptions of the time of enactment hold substantially true. After that, however, manifest intent - in terms of the
193. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note l, at 817, 818.
194. Posner, Reading of Statutes, supra note 1, at 290. Posner urges concentration on intent
(what the legislature expected to accomplish) as opposed to motive (why it acted the way it did).
Id. at 272; see also R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 98101 (1975); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966).
195. Mikva, The Shifting Sands of Legal Topography (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REv.
534, 542-43 (1982).
196. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 164. Professor Macey has offered a different approach to statutory construction. Based on a conception of the institutional role of the judiciary
as a check on factional pressure, he would emphasize ostensible or expressed intent, to the derogation of hidden motivations that are often the product of special-interest pressure. See Macey,
An Interest Group Model supra note 64, at 249-50.
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accomplishment of the goals specified in the legislation or its history
- becomes meaningless. There is no way of knowing whether the
legislature would have wished to pursue the same goals under the new
circumstances. While the letter of the law must still be enforced until
the statute is repealed or modified, it hardly usurps the legislative prerogative to conclude that situations not clearly covered are to be left to
more general statutory controls or simply to marketplace discipline. 197
On the question oflegitimacy, there is also an important mitigating
factor hidden within the second (and perhaps more powerful) of the
mechanisms for updating, the canon of deference. The very fact that in
each of the transitional cases an administrative agency had determined
that the conduct in question was lawful means that the court did not
act alone in the revisionist process. Through the agency's action the
proposal had been subject to something of a political process 198 - a
value, it is worth noting, strongly advocated by Supreme Court Justice
Scalia. 199 While this is hardly the equivalent of legislative action, it
diminishes the concern about judicial usurpation precisely because it
involves a check-and-balance procedure. In effect, the judicial process
is simply operating as an endorsement of the regulatory dialectic.
More study is necessary, taking into account a far greater number
of statutes than considered here, before the updating hypothesis can
truly be convincing. But the idea is appealing. One certainly wishes,
with Calabresi, that the process could be more candid if a new canon
197. This principle, a cousin at least to the maxim that application of a rule should cease
when the reasons for its enactment are no longer valid, is similar to one advanced by Frank
Easterbrook, who urges a presumption of statutory inapplicability absent clear evidence to the
contrary. While accepting the view that a court's only function is to carry out the will of the
enacting legislature, he believes that the presumption best assures that the legislature's careful
cost-benefit judgments are not upset by judicial misapplication. Easterbrook argues that (assuming no cost of formulation or enforcement) a rational legislator would prefer such a presumption;
hence, the principle is not necessarily inconsistent with a commitment to fidelity. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 1, at SS2. This article differs from Easterbrook in suggesting that a restrictive approach to the application of statutes is not invoked until there is a
determination that the prevailing landscape has changed sufficiently to warrant an end to expansive construction.
198. Whether or not that value should be a controlling one with respect to judicial review
generally, see Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. SOS, Sl0-12 (198S},
it is appealing when changed circumstances raise questions about the appropriateness of fidelity
to historic legislative purpose.
199. See Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. v, x-xi (1982). Consistent with
this, Scalia's decisions while on the court of appeals emphasized deference in the banking law
context. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors, 74S F.2d
677 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (regarding the Bank Holding Company Act); Securities Indus. Assn. v.
Comptroller, 76S F.2d 1196 (D.C. Cir. 198S) (dissenting on denial of petition for rehearing)
(regarding the McFadden Act). Scalia was on the panel, but not the author of the opinion, in
Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 92S (D.C. Cir. 1986), a transitionalist Glass-Steagall
case permitting marketing of securities-based IRA accounts, discussed at Part 11.C.2. supra.
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of construction is indeed what the courts are invoking. 200 The risk
otherwise is incoherence, to the extent that other judges (not to mention the legal community) misconstrue hidden transitional signals. In
light of concerns about the legitimacy of any explicit assumption of an
updating power and the strength of the rhetorical tradition of fidelity,
however, a request for such candor probably asks too much of the
judicial system. The evolution of the law of banking regulation will
undoubtedly continue in tension, attempting at the same time to have
the appearance of both consistency and currency.
At the very least, the transitional law of banking regulation is today more sophisticated intellectually than were its predecessor stages
in statutory evolution. The weight of disinterested academic commentary suggests that it is more sensible as well. Hopefully, Congress will
sooner rather than later do its own revision of the obsolete banking
statutes. Until then, however, there may be something to say for even
today's subtle, restrained process of judicial updating.
200. See also Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731 (1987).

